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Accurate measures for technology adoption and transition are needed to provide objective 
evaluation systems for DoD acquisition programs.  Currently, the DoD uses cost, 
schedule, and performance to evaluate the success of their programs.  Research from this 
area of study suggests that although cost, schedule, and performance have their benefits, 
these metrics do not give an entirely accurate representation of success.  A 
multidimensional framework involving additional measures by which to evaluate 
technologies might give the DoD a more reliable and complete account of their 
acquisition systems.  Better transition metrics could equate to an improved transition rate 
for the DoD, more efficient resource allocation, and fielding superior systems to the 
warfighter.  Specifically, this study was an assessment of the DARPA AEO and how they 
should measure success with regards to technology transition and adoption.  Through 
greater comprehension of this topic, the AEO hopes to improve the transition rate for 
their programs by understanding the factors that they can affect.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY (DARPA) 
1. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 
The Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA) was created in 1958 under the 
Eisenhower administration.  The agency was the brain child of then Secretary of Defense, 
Neil H. McElroy, who came up with the idea in response to the Soviets’ launch of 
Sputnik, the first man-made orbiting satellite.  Originally stood up to handle the satellite 
and space research and development projects, ARPA was to provide focus to the nation’s 
efforts with the ultimate goal being to dominate the Soviets in space (Belfiore, 2009).  As 
described by Belfiore (2009): 
It would become the research-and-development branch of the military, 
with creative-minded program managers in charge of funding out-there 
research around the country that might or might not bear fruit, but that had 
a potential for big payoffs.  Those projects that did not succeed would be 
handed off to the service branches of the military for further development 
and eventual use. 
DARPA’s mission is to maintain the technological superiority of the U.S. military 
and prevent technological surprise from harming our national security by sponsoring 
revolutionary, high-payoff research bridging the gap between fundamental discoveries 
and their military use (DARPA, 2010).  Credited for the invention of the internet, the first 
stealth fighter (DARPA website, 2010), and other technologies that have significantly 
advanced the state of the art, DARPA is known for being one of the most innovative 
organizations in the Department of Defense (DoD).  DARPA’s reputation for tackling the 
hardest technological challenges has even earned the agency their own phrase used to 
describe problems that are extremely hard to solve: “DARPA hard.” 
As a research and development (R&D) agency independent of the military 
services, technology transition and adoption is extremely relevant to the mission of 
DARPA.  There is no dispute as to their ability to successfully develop cutting-edge 
technologies, but bridging the gap between the agency and the ultimate end user remains 
a significant challenge for DARPA to overcome.  This study hopes to provide DARPA, 
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and more specifically, the Adaptive Execution Office (AEO), a better understanding of 
the topic as well as insight into how they might improve the technology transition and 
adoption of their programs. 
2. Adaptive Execution Office (AEO) 
The AEO was created by DARPA in 2009.  Their mission is to harness the 
creativity of DARPA program managers and America’s science and engineering 
community to transition DARPA technology to the warfighter faster and more effectively 
(AEO website, 2010).  Whereas DARPA’s focus has been more long-term in order to 
prevent technology surprise from harming America’s national security (DARPA, 2010), 
the AEO’s focus is more near-term; addressing the technological challenges of the 
current warfighter with rapid, adaptable solutions.  Their objective is to promote 
adaptability in the DoD by getting additional revolutionary technologies to the field more 
quickly and by advancing technologies that will help them build in adaptability from first 
principles (AEO website, 2010).  With present conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, the 
AEO’s mission adds even more relevance to DARPA’s contribution to the warfighter. 
The uses four thrust areas to further define their objectives as an organization and 
provide more focus to their mission areas.  The four thrust areas were taken directly from 
the AEO website (2010) and have been listed below with a brief description of each area: 
• Adaptive Systems: Adaptive platforms and architectures that enable more 
effective, flexible and mission-responsive systems as well as support fast 
insertion of new DARPA technology for purposes of field testing and 
operational deployment. 
• Operationally-Focused Systems Integration: Systems that align DARPA 
technologies with explicit opportunities for military operational impact 
intended to yield revolutionary new mission capabilities or enable 
significant increases in mission effectiveness. 
• Accelerated Systems Production Technology: Innovative technologies that 
optimize product development and pipeline management to accelerate the 
production of new hardware and software systems to be delivered to the 
warfighter. 
• Comprehensive System Assessment: New system assessment technologies 
and techniques that enable efficient, rigorous, and informative readiness 
assessments of emerging and mature DARPA technology. 
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B. TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION AND TRANSITION 
Technology adoption and transition is a very complex topic involving many 
intricacies.  It is curious then, that the DoD uses the three simplest metrics to evaluate the 
success of defense acquisition programs: cost, schedule, and performance.  Not to infer 
that cost, schedule, and performance are bad metrics by which to gauge success.  On the 
contrary, there are many advantages to using these metrics.  For example, all three are 
easily quantifiable, making them easy to measure.  Infrastructure exists, i.e. processes, 
methods, and systems, to easily track them.  They are easy to define and it is simple to 
formulate common understandings of what they mean across multiple organizations.  
However, despite their strengths, many studies in this topic have shown that they do not 
tell the whole story, and sometimes, paint an entirely inaccurate picture.  
Many schools of thought exist on the subject and an abundance of research has 
been conducted to provide understanding of the multiple facets that influence technology 
adoption and transition.  In general, most research on transition measurement 
recommends a much wider range of success measures than just cost, schedule, and 
performance.  These metrics are usually contingent on some aspect(s) of the technology 
being measured.  This section should provide the reader perspective into these issues as 
well as the background into the intricate subject of technology adoption and transition. 
1. Why Do We Need to Measure Transition? 
Accurate measures of technology transition are needed for several reasons.  
Concerning this study, the DARPA AEO asked the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) for 
an assessment of how it should measure success with regards to technology transition and 
adoption.  The AEO has two primary reasons for needing better measurements by which 
to evaluate technology transition.  The first reason is to simply better understand the 
subject.  Through greater comprehension of this topic, the AEO hopes to improve the 
transition rate for their programs by understanding the factors that they can affect.  The 
second reason the AEO has for needing better metrics for technology transition is to be 
able to justify spending taxpayer money on their programs.  Better transition metrics can  
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help tell a more accurate story to decision makers and help the AEO secure future 
funding for their programs.  This second reason will be discussed in more detail in the 
rest of this section.     
The most prevalent reason for DoD organizations is the need to objectively 
quantify transition for programs funded by taxpayer dollars.  Federal technology transfer 
programs are increasingly being expected to increase the rate of transfer and to quantify 
the effectiveness of their transfer programs (Spann, Adams, and Souder, 1995, February).  
Measuring successful transition gives justification for R&D funding provided by the 
Government.  In organizations like DARPA, where successful transition is at the heart of 
their primary mission, ways to quantifiably measure successful transition could provide 
justification not only for their programs, but for the organizations themselves.  The 
correct metrics and measures of effectiveness can provide this validation that taxpayer 
money is not being wasted or misappropriated. 
To put it into current context, there is much debate about ending the use of 
supplemental appropriations.  Supplemental appropriations are additions to regular 
annual appropriations and provide budget authority beyond the original estimates for 
programs or activities that are too urgent to be postponed until the next regular 
appropriation (DoD Office of Inspector General, 2009, April).  The use of supplementals 
has increased over the last several years, largely as a result of an increase in DoD funding 
and the use of supplementals to provide that funding for activities such as the Global War 
on Terrorism (GWOT) (GAO, 2008, January).  With contingency operations decreasing 
in Iraq and remarks given by President Obama (2009, December) to begin pulling troops 
out of Afghanistan in 2011, the activity for the GWOT will decrease along with the use 
of supplemental appropriations.  Simply put, organizations will be competing for the 
same piece of pie they have gotten in previous years with supplemental funding, when in 
reality, the pie itself has gotten much smaller.  As organizations become forced to justify 
their budgetary needs, the need for metrics that accurately evaluate and measure 
technology transition will most likely increase. 
It must be stated that as much as measures of transition are needed, the 
importance of public perception of technology transition cannot be understated.  
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American taxpayers have little tolerance for over-budget programs that are constantly 
behind schedule.  With mounting budget pressures escalating as a result of the recession, 
there is even less room for error.  In a conference hosted by Credit Suisse and Aviation 
Week, Defense Secretary Robert Gates pushed the military services to find $100 billion 
in savings from overhead over the next five years to plow back into troop costs and 
weapons programs (Shalal-Esa, 2010, December).  Taking into account the public 
pressure for acquisition reform and the current budget challenges, the DoD will be 
required to do more with less.  These issues may be compounded by the fact that 
technology transition is not black and white.  Success and failure are subjective, measures 
are not identical across all technologies, and transition is not always quick.  Public 
opinion and perspective of technology transition is just as important as the measures 
themselves.   
2. Multi-Dimensional Framework 
Finding the right metrics to measure project and program success is hard because 
project success is multidimensional.  Freeman and Beale (1992) summarized this point 
well: 
Success means different things to different people.  An architect may 
consider success in terms of aesthetic appearance, an engineer in terms of 
technical competence, an accountant in terms of dollars spent under 
budget, a human resources manager in terms of employee satisfaction.  
Chief executive officers rate their success in the stock market.   
The DoD primarily measures the success of their acquisition programs with 
metrics that track cost, schedule, and performance.  Measuring the cost, schedule, and 
performance may be effective for tracking conventional acquisition programs, but with 
regard to technology transition, in many instances, these metrics may not be enough.  
Shenhar, Dvir, Levy, and Maltz (2001) commented that measuring projects solely on 
cost, schedule, and performance can lead to an incomplete and misleading assessment.    
For example, a program that develops a technology on time, within budget, and performs 
as advertised meets all conventional standards for success.  However, if the technology 
gets to the user and the user is unsatisfied with it, even over a non-performance issue, the 
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user will not employ the technology, and the transition has failed.  In order to assess the 
true quality of transition within the DoD, the DoD must first reassess how they measure 
it, and subsequently how they evaluate their program managers who develop the 
technologies.        
Shenhar, Dvir, Levy, and Maltz (2001) developed a multi-dimensional framework 
for the assessment of project success which reflects how success measures are contingent 
on time.  Their model consisted of four dimensions: project efficiency, impact on the 
customer, business success, and preparing for the future.  Included in the following table 
are their four success dimensions along with the measures for each dimension. 
Table 1.   Emerged four success dimensions (From Shenhar, Dvir, Levy, and Maltz, 
2001)  
Success dimension Measures 
1.  Project efficiency Meeting schedule goal 
 Meeting budget goal 
2.  Impact on the customer Meeting functional performance 
 Meeting technical specifications 
 Fulfilling customer needs 
 Solving a customer's problem 
 The customer is using the product 
 Customer satisfaction 
3.  Business success Commercial success 
 Creating a large market share 
4.  Preparing for the future Creating a new market 
 Creating a new product line 
  Developing a new technology 
 
As the above study alluded to, cost, schedule, and performance metrics do not 
force organizations to view technology adoption and transition from any point of view 
other than their own.  In their study of project success dimensions, Lipovetsky, Tishler, 
Dvir, and Shenhar (1997) found that although these measures of success can help to 
evaluate internal organizational goals, other measures should be used to evaluate external 
effectiveness, such as the project’s impact on the customer and on the developing 
organization itself.  Lipovetsky, Tishler, Dvir, and Shenhar (1997) measured the success 
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of 110 defense projects based on four dimensions: meeting design goals, benefits to the 
customer, benefits to the developing organization, and benefits to the defense and 
national infrastructure.  Out of these four dimensions, their analysis concluded that 
benefits to the customer was by far the most important success dimension.  Furthermore, 
other areas of study, such as marketing literature on new product development, reflect the 
same findings, where user satisfaction is a key measure of success.  The findings of this 
study support the argument for using additional metrics, other than cost, schedule, and 
performance, to evaluate successful technology adoption and transition.  In particular, 
metrics that track how the technology is meeting the customer’s needs should be used.   
As these examples illustrate, a more comprehensive list of metrics that accounts 
for the needs of all parties involved could help to improve technology adoption and 
transition measurement within organizations using only cost, schedule, and performance 
to track their success.  As Spann, Adams, and Souder (1995, February) summarized,  
[Sponsors, developers, and adopters] could improve their measurement 
practices by identifying those measures most appropriate in the total 
process rather than focusing on the most easily measured dimensions, by 
developing a shared understanding of the measures most important to each 
party to the process and by working toward complementary goals and 
measures.  
3. Project Strategy Based Success Measures  
Griffin and Page (1996) take a different approach, where they believe that the 
most appropriate set of measures for assessing project-level success depends on the 
project strategy.  Using their example, success criteria will be different for a new product 
that creates an entirely new market than for a project that extends an existing product 
line.  To expand on their theory, if success depends on project strategy, then strategy 
depends on factors such as the values and priorities of the organization.  Different 
organizations with different priorities will have different strategies and thus, different 
measures of success.  For example, the strategy for a firm developing a product for profit 
will be very different than a non-profit organization, like the DoD, developing products 
for the nation’s defense.  The priorities of these two organizations are very different and 
thus the metrics by which they measure success will be different as well.     
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A previous study conducted by Griffin and Page (as cited in Griffin and Page, 
1996) determined that project success can be grouped into three independent dimensions: 
consumer-based, financial, and technical or process-based success.  Griffin and Page 
(1996) describe the perfect product that meets all three of these dimensions: 
The perfect product (a silver bullet) is wildly sought after by customers 
who are delighted with it, provides enormous financial return to the firm, 
and in addition, is technically elegant, provides a performance advantage 
to the firm, or was commercialized efficiently. 
The problem is that the perfect product development project does not exist.  
Realistically, organizations will have to make tradeoffs between the three dimensions 
mentioned above based on their priorities, and since every organization is different, they 
will require different measures of success.  It is for these reasons it could be argued that a 
standard set of metrics is inappropriate to measure technology transition across 
organizations.  One could also argue that most projects within a single organization are 
unique and thus require their own measures of success.  If a standard set of metrics is not 
appropriate for measuring different projects, it begs the question as to why the DoD uses 
a standard set of metrics (cost, schedule, and performance) across every program?   
4. An Alternative View 
Not everyone agrees that unique sets of project-based measures are the answer.  
Skogstad, Steinert, Gumerlock, and Leifer (2009) argue in favor of:  
The need for a universal design project outcome performance 
measurement metric that allows comparison of design projects with 
different natures.  [Skogstad, Steinert, Gumerlock, and Leifer] claim that 
without such a common denominating measurement, resource allocation 
for diversified companies and venture capitals must remain rather 
suboptimal, and the creation of design research theory is severely 
hindered. 
A universal measurement metric would be incredibly useful for organizations like 
DARPA who develop technologies ranging from microchips to unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs).  Such a metric would afford them the ability to compare different technologies 
to each other for the sake of comparing transition efforts and making resource allocation 
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decisions.  Though it is hard to deny the appeal, the feasibility of a universal 
measurement metric is a long way from being realistic.   
5. Viewing Failure As Success 
Just as success is hard to define, in an innovative environment where the 
development of technologies often leads to unexpected results, failure can be hard to 
define as well.  Elmquist and Masson (2009) question the logic of setting goals at the 
beginning of a project in an innovative environment because innovation often yields 
unexpected results.  They go on to explain that cost, schedule, and performance 
measures, or the quality-cost-time (QCT) framework as they call it, has other 
shortcomings as well.  The QCT evaluation framework ignores value creation outside 
specifications and considers projects as separate units, independent of each other, 
ignoring both how projects generate knowledge and how knowledge is transferred 
between projects (Elmquist and Masson, 2009).  Many projects in an innovative 
environment fail, but products of failed R&D projects often help to advance other 
projects.  The QCT framework has no way of accounting for that which is gained during 
failure. 
Innovative ideas inherently involve risk, which creates inconsistent goals for 
public agencies like the DoD.  Leung and Isaacs (2008) summarize this issue, noting that 
while innovation necessarily involves risk, this orientation can sometimes be considered 
in conflict with the stewardship role of a public sector agency.  In an innovative 
environment, risk often translates to failure.  As stewards of taxpayer money, the DoD 
makes every effort to avoid failure, but still requires innovation to keep the military 
relevant in the context of today’s conflicts.  Many organizational processes and 
constructs, especially within the acquisition framework, work to reduce risk while 
consequently decreasing innovation.  As Elmquist and Masson (2009) stated:  
To develop innovative capabilities, companies need to promote creativity 
(e.g., Amabile, 1998) and experimentation (e.g., Thomke, 2001) and keep 
a certain amount of slack in their structures (Nohria and Gulati, 1996) – all 
connected to taking risks – which is exactly what project management 
methods try to eliminate.     
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In the conventional defense acquisition environment, failure is often times 
considered a negative consequence of poor program management.  In the private 
industry, failure is not always perceived as negative.  At Google for instance, they allow 
their people to pursue projects that are of a personal interest and do not penalize them if 
they fail.  In fact, they encourage their people to fail as long as they do it quickly and 
intelligently.  By allowing their people to follow their personal interests, it cultivates a 
culture of innovation and creativity.  Encouraging them to fail quickly gives their people 
confidence that they will not be penalized for their ideas, but also promotes abandoning 
ideas that don’t materialize before too many resources are committed to them.  Google 
also looks at failure as an opportunity to learn rather than a waste of time and resources.  
Technology adoption should be viewed from this same perspective. 
As mentioned before, the traditional view of failure within the DoD is negative.  
This is understandable considering that the cost of failure in a DoD organization could 
mean the loss of life.  With millions and sometimes billions of taxpayer money at stake, it 
is obvious as to why the defense acquisition community also views failure negatively.  
However, failure, much like success, is subjective.  One could view failure, especially as 
it pertains to the development of technology, as a valuable opportunity for learning.  
Above, Google was used as an example of how failure can be a powerful driver of 
innovation.  The DoD must be cognizant of the subjective nature of measuring transition 
in order to be effective at evaluating new and innovative technologies.   
DoD organizations cannot manage technology transition the same way as 
conventional acquisition and expect to get results.  Failure is a necessary and important 
component of innovation, where one cannot be separated from the other.  This 
relationship complicates technology adoption and transition greatly.  Innovation forces 
organizations like the DoD into a delicate trade space, where the DoD must balance their 
responsibilities to the American taxpayer and their requirement for cutting edge 
technologies needed for the next conflict. 
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6. Contingent Effectiveness Model and the Effects of Public Policy 
In his examination of university and government technology transfer activities, 
Bozeman (2000) uses the Contingent Effectiveness Model to describe the subjective 
nature of technology transition.  The major assumption of the Contingent Effectiveness 
Model is no single notion of effectiveness makes much sense, either theoretically or 
practically (Bozeman, 2000).  Bozeman (2000) explains that the model includes five 
broad dimensions that determine effectiveness: (1) characteristics of the transfer agent, 
(2) characteristics of the transfer media, (3) characteristics of the transfer object, (4) the 
demand environment, and (5) characteristics of the transfer recipient.  These metrics are 
not all inclusive, but suggest overarching metrics applicable to any transition situation, 
while providing a good example as to the complexity of transition measurement. 
Another factor that significantly influences technology transition is public policy.  
Bozeman (2000) uses the Cooperative Technology Paradigm to describe one of the 
Government’s roles as a broker, developing policies affecting industrial technology 
development and innovation.  In Bozeman’s (2000) opinion, the most significant U.S. 
public policy was enacted in the 1980s and 1990s.  These policies highlighted the issue of 
technology transition and spurred research for technology transfer within the U.S. and 
elsewhere (Bozeman, 2000).  The table below includes the list of technology policies 










Table 2.   Major technology policy legislation of the 1980s and 1990s (From 
Bozeman, 2000) 
 
The central point of cooperative technology policies is clear: putting universities 
and government laboratories to greater use as progenitors of technology and applied 
science (Bozeman, 2000).  Public policy has had a profound effect on the issue of 
technology transition, particularly in providing exposure to the issue for research. 
C. ORGANIZATION OF REPORT 
This study is focused on the issue of technology transition and adoption, and 
helping the AEO of DARPA create a framework for evaluating their programs for 
successful transition.  In Chapter II, the methodology is discussed to include the initial 
interviews with acquisition professionals, the database that was created for the study, 
explanation of the categories and metrics used in the database, and the program 
completion reports (PCRs) that were provided by DARPA to conduct the research. 
In Chapter III the complexities and issues of technology transition metrics will be 
explored.  Current metrics used to evaluate technology transfer along with the 
subjectivity of this area will be considered.  Also, the technology adoption indices that 
were created and used to evaluate the PCRs will also be discussed in this chapter. 
In Chapter IV, analysis will be conducted on the data gathered in the database and 
the theoretical framework created for the AEO will be explained.  Correlations and 
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regressions were run on the different metrics evaluated within the database and analyzed.  
The AEO Measurement Model will be reviewed as well as the different factors that make 
up the model.   
Lastly, in Chapter V, the recommendations will be explained and the areas for 
further study will be outlined. 
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The research methodology for this thesis consisted of three facets.  First, seven 
interviews were conducted with acquisition professionals from various acquisition 
organizations within the DoD to collect their opinions and thoughts on technology 
adoption within their respective organizations. Second, a database was built with metrics 
that were vetted from the interviews, as well as from research conducted on technology 
adoption.  To collect data for the database, DARPA granted access to 116 PCRs from the 
AEO.  Third, the data was analyzed and a model for technology adoption was created.  
The analysis preceding the model consisted of statistical analysis of the different metrics 
used to categorize the 116 technologies. 
A. INTERVIEWS 
Interviews with seven acquisition professionals were conducted from different 
organizations within the DoD.  The acquisition professionals consisted of field grade 
program managers from the special operations community, senior-ranking civilian 
directors from the special operations and conventional acquisition communities, a 
federally funded research and development center engineer from the conventional 
acquisition community, and a retired military member working for the defense industry.  
They were chosen for this study because they provided a diversity of acquisition 
perspectives and they each had at least 12 or more years of acquisition experience.  The 
goal of the interviews was to collect preliminary data on technology adoption from the 
acquisition professionals’ perspectives and to attempt to identify metrics for successful 
technology adoption to include in the database.  The interviews were conducted via 
telephone and lasted in the range of 45 minutes to two hours depending on the time the 
interviewee could allot. 
The interviews with the acquisition professionals yielded many interesting 
findings.  Many of the results were used as metrics, or provided valuable inputs for 
metrics, in the database.  There were also other significant takeaways from the interviews 
that should be noted. 
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After the interviews were completed, one of the more obvious observations that 
emerged was the lack of a standard system, framework, or process for technology 
transition and adoption.  The research in this area is consistent with this finding, as is 
discussed in the first chapter of this study, but it is notable that the interviews confirmed 
it.  Although no standard framework exists within the DoD for technology transition and 
adoption, the DoD does use standard metrics, cost, schedule, and performance, by which 
to measure technology transition and adoption.  In fact, many firms in industry also use 
the same metrics.  As was discussed in the first chapter, a multi-dimensional approach 
could offer a more accurate measurement of technology transition.  In essence, this study 
could help to identify additional metrics the DoD, and more specifically the DARPA, 
could use to increase their transition rate. 
Another significant observation that came out of the interviews was the existence 
of two different models for technology transition within the DoD.  One model exists 
within the special operations acquisition community, while the second exists within the 
conventional acquisition community.  In both models, technology readiness level (TRL) 
and user involvement were the key drivers of transition.  In the special operations 
acquisition community, program managers rarely deal with immature technologies, i.e. 
technologies with low TRLs.  The speed required to field a technology to the warfighter 
is very important in this community, thus these program mangers do not typically have 
the time required to develop technologies for use.  The majority of their programs involve 
technologies that can readily be incorporated into systems or used in an “as-is” manner to 
provide the needed capability.  The special operations program managers also have direct 
user involvement in their programs.  By having direct access to the actual users of their 
systems, program managers get direct feedback to incorporate into their programs.  These 
firsthand inputs help the technology perform to the user’s expectations and thus give it a 
much more likely chance of being adopted. 
 In the conventional acquisition community, program managers rarely have the 
same luxuries as their counterparts from the special operations community.  
Requirements for defense acquisition programs come from the Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process, where the program managers are 
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assigned programs that are needed to fulfill particular requirements.  Often times, there is 
not a commercially viable solution that can be taken and used to meet these requirements.  
In fact, even if a commercial solution exists, it still typically requires modification that 
involves developing the technology.  The point being, that program managers from the 
conventional acquisition community are often forced to develop immature technologies 
with low TRLs.  They do not get to pick and choose technologies based on their 
technological maturity.  Program managers from the conventional acquisition community 
rarely have access to their direct end user in the way special operations program 
managers do.  Many times, end user involvement on a conventional acquisition program 
involves an end user representative from a major command or headquarters.  Suffice it to 
say, conventional acquisition program managers do not get the same valuable feedback 
from representatives of the user as they would from a direct user of the system.  Without 
direct end user involvement, the likelihood that the technology will be well-received by 
the end user decreases, along with its chances for adoption. 
B. DATABASE 
The database was built to evaluate the 116 technologies documented in the PCRs 
provided by DARPA on different technology adoption metrics.  The following sections 
describe the PCRs and the different categories and metrics used in the database.  The 
database in its entirety can be found in Appendix E of this study.   
1. Program Completion Reports 
A PCR is a mechanism for DARPA program managers to capture important 
details that pertain to their projects.  Typically, a PCR contained an explanation on the 
need for the technology, the state of the art at the time the program was started, the 
important development details of the technology, and the degree to which each 
technology transitioned.  Each of 116 PCRs were read to determine whether they would 
be included in the database.  If the PCR related to a particular technology, it was                              
evaluated against the metrics and its data was collected for inclusion into the database.  If 
the reports did not pertain to a technology, they were omitted from the database.  Out of 
the 116 PCRs, three of the reports were excluded for not containing any information on a 
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specific technology: Training Superiority/DARWARS, Photonics Technology Access 
Project (PTAP), and Sonofusion.  It is important to note that by conventional standards, 
the word “program” typically denotes a major weapons system within defense acquisition 
and the word “project” denotes a smaller endeavor, usually part of a program.  DARPA 
uses the word “program” even though their programs typically differ greatly in size and 
scope than conventional acquisition programs.  Unless specifically describing a program 
of record (POR) or major acquisition program, the two terms are used synonymously 
throughout this report.  
The metrics for the database were derived from the interviews conducted with 
acquisition professionals, as well as research conducted on the subject of technology 
adoption.  Each of the 116 PCRs was read and, based on the information contained within 
the PCR, each of the 116 technologies were evaluated on each individual metric 
contained within the database.  It is important to note that the PCRs were read and 
evaluated on each individual metric and category solely by the author.  At the beginning 
of data collection, 22 metrics and 25 categories were recorded for each technology.  As 
the research was analyzed, many metrics were omitted from the database that were either 
found to be statistically insignificant or insufficient data existed within the PCRs to 
evaluate the technologies on these metrics.  After these metrics were omitted, the final 
version of the database contained 15 metrics and 16 categories for each technology. 
2. Database Categories and Metrics 
To better understand technology adoption, it was necessary to compare both 
successfully and unsuccessfully transitioned technologies and evaluate them against the 
same metrics.  The metrics selected for the database represented findings from the 
interviews with acquisition professionals or from research conducted on the subject of 
technology adoption.  The other categories included in the database collected descriptive 
data for comparing the technologies.  The following is the list of the different categories 
and metrics selected for inclusion in the database, and a description of how the 
technologies from the PCRs were coded for each category and metric. 
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a. Technology Fielded to Warfighter 
This category was coded in the database as either a “1” or “0”, where 1 = 
Yes and 0 = No.  The determination for this category was based on whether or not the 
technology transitioned to a military user in an “as is” condition upon project completion.  
Significant aspects of technologies that were only partially transitioned to military users 
were coded as a “1” in this category.  Reports that did not provide adequate detail to 
make a judgment were assigned a “0” for this category.  For the sake of avoiding double 
counting technologies in this and the POR category, it was assumed that technologies 
fielded to the warfighter were made into their own PORs, but not recognized in the POR 
category unless it transitioned into another, or multiple, PORs. 
b. Receiving Service/Organization 
If the technology was transitioned, the organization to which it was 
transitioned was recorded in this category.  Technologies that were only partially 
transitioned to other organizations were also recorded in this category.  If a technology 
was partially transitioned to multiple organizations, all organizations were listed in this 
category.  To avoid any proprietary issues, if the technology was transitioned to the 
commercial community, “contractor” was recorded in this category. 
c. Project Transitioned to Program of Record (POR) 
This category was coded in the database as either a “1” or “0”, where 1 = 
Yes and 0 = No.  PCRs that did not specifically state whether the technology was made 
into a POR or did not provide adequate detail to make a judgment were coded a “0” in 
this category.  Due to the fact that not all technologies are designed to become individual 
PORs, technologies that became a significant part of another POR were marked “1” for 
this category. 
d. Technical Spin Offs to DoD Science and Technology (S&T) 
Projects 
This category was coded in the database as either a “1” or “0”, where 1 = 
Yes and 0 = No.  This category determined whether technologies were transitioned to 
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DoD S&T projects for further development.  Technologies that were only partially 
transitioned to DoD S&T projects were also coded as a “1” in this category.  Reports that 
did not provide adequate detail to make a judgment were assigned a “0” for this category.   
e. Technical Spin Offs Into Other DARPA Projects 
This category was coded in the database as either a “1” or “0”, where 1 = 
Yes and 0 = No.  This category determined whether technologies were transitioned into 
other DARPA projects for further development or inclusion into other technologies.   
Technologies that were only partially transitioned into other DARPA projects were also 
coded as a “1” in this category.  Reports that did not provide adequate detail to make a 
judgment were assigned a “0” for this category. 
f. Spin Offs Into Commercial Projects 
This category was coded in the database as either a “1” or “0”, where 1 = 
Yes and 0 = No.  This category determined whether technologies were transitioned to 
commercial organizations for further development.  Technologies that were only partially 
transitioned to commercial organizations were also coded as a “1” in this category.  
Reports that did not provide adequate detail to make a judgment were assigned a “0” for 
this category. 
g. Not Transitioned 
This category was coded in the database as either a “1” or “0”, where 1 = 
Yes and 0 = No.  This category determined whether technologies were not transitioned 
and discontinued altogether at the completion of the project.  Technologies that were only 
partially transitioned were coded as a “0” in this category.  Reports that did not provide 
adequate detail to make a judgment were assigned a “1” for this category. 
h. Transition Speed 
This category was coded in the number of months it took for the 
technology to be transferred from project start to completion.  This category will be 
marked with “N/A” if the technology was not transitioned or “UKN” (unknown) if the 
transition speed was not given in the report. 
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i. Major/Core Aspect of Project 
This category was coded in the database as either a “1” or “0”, where 1 = 
Yes and 0 = No.  It measures the extent to which the technology was transitioned.  If a 
major or core aspect of the project was transitioned for use within another organization, 
this technology was coded as a “1” in this category.  If the technology was not 
transitioned, or if only a minor portion of the technology was transitioned, the technology 
will be coded a “0” for this category.  Reports that did not provide adequate detail to 
make a judgment were assigned a “0” for this category. 
j. Minor/Trivial Aspect of Project 
This category was coded in the database as either a “1” or “0”, where 1 = 
Yes and 0 = No.  It measures the extent to which the technology was transitioned.  If a 
minor or trivial aspect of the project was transitioned for use within another organization, 
this technology was coded as a “1” in this category.  If the technology was not 
transitioned at all, or if a major portion of the technology was transitioned, the technology 
will be coded a “0” for this category.  Reports that did not provide adequate detail to 
make a judgment were assigned a “0” for this category. 
k. PCR Word Count 
The word count of each PCR was recorded for this category. 
l. Money Obligated for Further Development 
This category was coded in the database as either a “1” or “0”, where 1 = 
Yes and 0 = No.  If an organization was willing to invest further money into the 
technology, the technology will be coded a “1” for this category.  If the report made no 
specific mention to further funding, it will be assumed that no money was obligated for 
further development and the technology will be coded a “0” for this category. 
m. Technically Baffling Report 
This category was coded in the database as either a “1” or “0”, where 1 = 
Yes and 0 = No.  If the report required extensive background knowledge in a particular 
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subject and/or was written in a language that made it incomprehensible to the average 
person, the PCR was deemed technically baffling and coded a “1” for this category.  If 
any of the reports were written in an overly technical manner to the point where making a 
judgment on one of the categories proved to be difficult, the column was coded “TBR” 
(Technically Baffling Report) for that category. 
n. Test Environment 
This category was coded in the database as a “1”, “2”, or “3”, where 1 = 
Lab, 2 = Field, and 3 = Other.  If the technology was tested using modeling and 
simulation, analytical studies, or in a lab (controlled) environment, it will be coded a “1” 
for this category.  If the technology was tested in the field or a simulated field 
environment, it will be coded a “2” for this category.  If the technology was a 
combination of both lab and field testing, it will be coded a “3” for this category.  If it 
cannot be ascertained from the PCR how the technology was tested, it will be coded 
“N/A” for this category. 
o. Improves Warfighter Safety 
This metric was coded in the database on a “1” to “7” Likert scale.  The 
technology was rated anywhere from “1” to “7” based on varying degrees to which the 
technology would directly improve warfighter safety, ranging from “would not improve 
safety,” a “1” on the scale, to “would vastly improve safety,” a “7” on the scale.  To 
distinguish the measures in between “1” and “7,” the following numbers equated to these 
ratings: “2” represented “trivial improvement to warfighter safety,” “3” represented 
“somewhat improves warfighter safety,” “4” represented “improves warfighter safety,” 
“5” represented “notable improvement to warfighter safety,” and “6” represented 
“significantly improves warfighter safety.”    
p. Improves Warfighter Job Satisfaction 
This metric was coded in the database on a “1” to “7” Likert scale.  The 
technology was rated anywhere from “1” to “7” based on varying degrees to which the 
technology would directly improve warfighter job satisfaction, ranging from “would not 
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improve job satisfaction,” a “1” on the scale, to “would vastly improve job satisfaction,” 
a “7” on the scale.  To distinguish the measures in between “1” and “7,” the following 
numbers equated to these ratings: “2” represented “trivial improvement to warfighter job 
satisfaction,” “3” represented “somewhat improves warfighter job satisfaction,” “4” 
represented “improves warfighter job satisfaction,” “5” represented “notable 
improvement to warfighter job satisfaction,” and “6” represented “significantly improves 
warfighter job satisfaction.”    
q. Addresses Immediate Warfighter Need 
This metric was coded in the database on a “1” to “7” Likert scale.  The 
technology was rated anywhere from “1” to “7” based on varying degrees to which the 
technology addresses an immediate warfighter need, ranging from “does not address an 
immediate warfighter need,” a “1” on the scale, to “significantly addresses an immediate 
warfighter need,” a “7” on the scale.  To distinguish the measures in between “1” and 
“7,” the following numbers equated to these ratings: “2” represented “trivially addresses 
immediate warfighter need,” “3” represented “somewhat addresses immediate warfighter 
need,” “4” represented “addresses immediate warfighter need,” “5” represented “notably 
addresses immediate warfighter need,” and “6” represented “very much addresses 
immediate warfighter need.”    
r. Addresses Future Warfighter Need 
This metric was coded in the database on a “1” to “7” Likert scale.  The 
technology was rated anywhere from “1” to “7” based on varying degrees to which the 
technology addresses a future warfighter need, ranging from “does not address a future 
warfighter need,” a “1” on the scale, to “significantly addresses a future warfighter need,” 
a “7” on the scale.  To distinguish the measures in between “1” and “7,” the following 
numbers equated to these ratings: “2” represented “trivially addresses future warfighter 
need,” “3” represented “somewhat addresses future warfighter need,” “4” represented 
“addresses future warfighter need,” “5” represented “notably addresses future warfighter 
need,” and “6” represented “very much addresses future warfighter need.”    
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s. Technological Maturity 
This metric was coded in the database on a “1” to “9” scale, based on the 
actual TRL scale used in defense acquisition.  The technology’s maturity was matched 
with the closest TRL description and coded in the database.  The TRL descriptions are 
included in the table below: 
Table 3.   Technology readiness level descriptions (From DoD Defense Acquisition 
Guidebook, 2006, July) 
TRL Level Description 
1. Basic principles observed and 
reported. 
Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific research begins to 
be translated into applied research and development. Examples 
might include paper studies of a technology's basic properties. 
2. Technology concept and/or 
application formulated. 
Invention begins. Once basic principles are observed, practical 
applications can be invented. Applications are speculative and there 
may be no proof or detailed analysis to support the assumptions. 
Examples are limited to analytic studies.  
3. Analytical and experimental critical 
function and/or characteristic proof of 
concept. 
Active research and development is initiated. This includes 
analytical studies and laboratory studies to physically validate 
analytical predictions of separate elements of the technology. 
Examples include components that are not yet integrated or 
representative. 
4. Component and/or breadboard 
validation in laboratory environment. 
Basic technological components are integrated to establish that they 
will work together. This is relatively "low fidelity" compared to the 
eventual system. Examples include integration of "ad hoc" 
hardware in the laboratory. 
5. Component and/or breadboard 
validation in relevant environment. 
Fidelity of breadboard technology increases significantly. The basic 
technological components are integrated with reasonably realistic 
supporting elements so it can be tested in a simulated environment. 
Examples include "high fidelity" laboratory integration of 
components. 
6. System/subsystem model or prototype 
demonstration in a relevant environment. 
Representative model or prototype system, which is well beyond 
that of TRL 5, is tested in a relevant environment. Represents a 
major step up in a technology's demonstrated readiness. Examples 
include testing a prototype in a high-fidelity laboratory environment 
or in simulated operational environment.  
7. System prototype demonstration in an 
operational environment. 
Prototype near, or at, planned operational system. Represents a 
major step up from TRL 6, requiring demonstration of an actual 
system prototype in an operational environment such as an aircraft, 
vehicle, or space. Examples include testing the prototype in a test 
bed aircraft. 
8. Actual system completed and 
qualified through test and demonstration. 
Technology has been proven to work in its final form and under 
expected conditions. In almost all cases, this TRL represents the 
end of true system development. Examples include developmental 
test and evaluation of the system in its intended weapon system to 
determine if it meets design specifications. 
9. Actual system proven through 
successful mission operations. 
Actual application of the technology in its final form and under 
mission conditions, such as those encountered in operational test 
and evaluation. Examples include using the system under 
operational mission conditions. 
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t. Perceived Usefulness 
This metric was coded in the database on a “1” to “7” Likert scale.  The 
technology was rated anywhere from “1” to “7” based on varying degrees of the 
technology’s perceived usefulness to the military, from “not useful,” a “1” on the scale, 
to “very useful,” a “7” on the scale.  If the technology’s development was stopped before 
the perceived usefulness could be determined, it was coded a “N/A” for this metric.  To 
distinguish the measures in between “1” and “7,” the following numbers equated to these 
ratings: “2” represented “trivially useful,” “3” represented “somewhat useful,” “4” 
represented “useful,” “5” represented “notably useful,” and “6” represented “significantly 
useful.”  This measure was coded because a significant amount of research on the 
technology adoption model suggests perceived usefulness to the end user is a good 
indicator of successful transition.  
u. Builds On Existing Technology, Continuous Vs. Disruptive 
This metric was coded in the database on a “1” to “7” Likert scale.  The 
technology was rated anywhere from “1” to “7” based on varying degrees to which the 
technology would build on existing technology.  Technologies that advance existing 
technologies in an evolutionary manner were rated as continuous, a “1” on the scale.  
Technologies that are innovative and revolutionary were rated as disruptive, a “7” on the 
scale.  To distinguish the measures in between “1” and “7,” the following numbers 
equated to these ratings: “2” represented “mostly continuous,” “3” represented 
“somewhat continuous,” “4” represented “in between continuous and disruptive,” “5” 
represented “somewhat disruptive,” and “6” represented “mostly disruptive.”  It is 
commonly accepted that continuous technologies typically involve less technological risk 
but provide less significant impacts in terms of technological advancement. In contrast, 
disruptive technologies usually require taking a much larger technological risk, but the 
technological payoff is much more significant.  To further understand this tradeoff and its 
relationship with technology transition, this metric was recorded. 
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v. Game Changing/Revolutionary Capability 
This metric was coded in the database on a “1” to “7” Likert scale.  The 
technology was rated anywhere from “1” to “7” based on varying degrees to which the 
technology would provide a revolutionary capability, from “not revolutionary,” a “1” on 
the scale, to “exceptionally revolutionary,” a “7” on the scale.  To distinguish the 
measures in between “1” and “7,” the following numbers equated to these ratings: “2” 
represented “trivial revolutionary capability,” “3” represented “somewhat revolutionary,” 
“4” represented “revolutionary,” “5” represented “notably revolutionary,” and “6” 
represented “significantly revolutionary.”  There is a lot of research that suggests 
technologies providing revolutionary capability have more significant impacts.  This 
metric was included in the database to explore the relationship between revolutionary 
capability and technology transition.  
w. Enhances Legacy Technology’s Performance 
This metric was coded in the database on a “1” to “7” Likert scale.  The 
technology was rated anywhere from “1” to “7” based on varying degrees to which it 
would enhance an existing technology’s performance, from “no enhancement,” a “1” on 
the scale, to “complete enhancement,” a “7” on the scale.  To distinguish the measures in 
between “1” and “7,” the following numbers equated to these ratings: “2” represented 
“trivial enhancement,” “3” represented “somewhat enhanced performance,” “4” 
represented “enhanced performance,” “5” represented “notable enhancement,” and “6” 
represented “significant enhancement.”  This metric was coded to account for the 
numerous legacy platforms the DoD upgrades on a continuous basis. 
x. Prepares DoD for the Future 
This metric was coded in the database on a “1” to “7” Likert scale.  The 
technology was rated anywhere from “1” to “7” based on varying degrees to which the 
technology prepares the DoD for the future in terms of creating a mission or need for 
future technologies and capabilities, from “not at all,” a “1” on the scale, to 
“exceptionally so,” a “7” on the scale.  To distinguish the measures in between “1” and 
“7,” the following numbers equated to these ratings: “2” represented “trivially prepares 
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DoD for the future,” “3” represented “somewhat prepares DoD for the future,” “4” 
represented “prepares DoD for the future,” “5” represented “notably prepares DoD for 
the future,” and “6” represented “significantly prepares DoD for the future.”  This metric 
is different than addresses future warfighter needs because it describes how technologies 
pave the way for subsequent technologies and create missions for capabilities that may 
not currently exist.  Prepares DoD for the future was coded in an attempt to determine the 
relationship between technologies that offer capability suited to fit future DoD 
missions/infrastructure and successful transition. 
y. Mission Fit 
This metric was coded in the database on a “1” to “7” Likert scale.  The 
technology was rated anywhere from “1” to “7” based on varying degrees to which the 
technology fits the mission needs of the DoD. The scale ranges from “no fit,” a “1” on 
the scale, to “great fit,” a “7” on the scale.  If the technology did not develop to a point 
where a determination could be made, “N/A” was used for this metric.  To distinguish the 
measures in between “1” and “7,” the following numbers equated to these ratings: “2” 
represented “trivial fit,” “3” represented “somewhat fits DoD mission needs,” “4” 
represented “fits DoD mission needs,” “5” represented “notable fit,” and “6” represented 
“significant fit.”  This metric is somewhat similar to the metric addresses immediate 
warfighter needs because often times mission needs of the DoD coincide with immediate 
warfighter needs.  However, mission fit goes beyond needs and also describes how well 
the technology fits into the existing DoD infrastructure.  It was coded to determine the 
relationship between technologies that offer capability suited to fit current DoD 
missions/infrastructure and successful transition. 
z. Flexibility In Mission Use 
This metric was coded in the database on a “1” to “7” Likert scale.  The 
technology was rated anywhere from “1” to “7” based on varying degrees to which the 
technology would be flexible enough to  meet various missions, from “not flexible,” a 
“1” on the scale, to “very flexible,” a “7” on the scale.  If the technology’s development 
was stopped before the flexibility could be determined or if this metric did not apply to 
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the specific technology, it was coded “N/A.”  To distinguish the measures in between “1” 
and “7,” the following numbers equated to these ratings: “2” represented “trivially 
flexible,” “3” represented “somewhat flexible,” “4” represented “flexible,” “5” 
represented “notably flexible,” and “6” represented “significantly flexible.”    This was 
included as a metric because it was hypothesized that flexible technologies would 
transition more readily in the DoD rather than inflexible technologies. 
aa. Adaptive to User Needs 
This metric was coded in the database on a “1” to “7” Likert scale.  The 
technology was rated anywhere from “1” to “7” based on varying degrees to which the 
technology could be adapted to meet different user needs, from “not adaptable,” a “1” on 
the scale, to “very adaptable,” a “7” on the scale.  If the technology’s development was 
stopped before the adaptability could be determined or if this metric did not apply to the 
specific technology, it was coded “N/A.”  To distinguish the measures in between “1” 
and “7,” the following numbers equated to these ratings: “2” represented “trivially 
adaptable,” “3” represented “somewhat adaptable,” “4” represented “adaptable,” “5” 
represented “notably adaptable,” and “6” represented “significantly adaptable.”  This 
metric was selected for the database because research on technology adoption shows that 
technologies that are well adapted to user needs are more likely to be adopted. 
bb. Interoperability With Existing Technologies 
This metric was coded in the database on a “1” to “7” Likert scale.  The 
technology was rated anywhere from “1” to “7” based on varying degrees to which the 
technology would be interoperable with legacy platforms, from “not interoperable,” a “1” 
on the scale, to “very interoperable,” a “7” on the scale.  If the technology’s development 
was stopped before the interoperability could be determined or if this metric did not apply 
to the specific technology, it was coded “N/A.”  To distinguish the measures in between 
“1” and “7,” the following numbers equated to these ratings: “2” represented “trivially 
interoperable,” “3” represented “somewhat interoperable,” “4” represented 




“significantly interoperable.”  This metric was selected because research in the areas of 
economics, information systems, and marketing suggests that interoperability is a key 
criterion for successful adoption.  
cc. Saves Government/User Resources 
This metric was coded in the database on a “1” to “7” Likert scale.  The 
technology was rated anywhere from “1” to “7” based on varying degrees to which the 
technology would save the government/user resources in the form of money, time, 
personnel, and/or assets.  The scale ranges from “no savings,” a “1” on the scale, to 
“significant savings,” a “7” on the scale.  If the technology’s development was stopped 
before the savings could be estimated or if this metric did not apply to the specific 
technology, it was coded “N/A.”  To distinguish the measures in between “1” and “7,” 
the following numbers equated to these ratings: “2” represented “trivially savings,” “3” 
represented “somewhat saved resources,” “4” represented “average savings,” “5” 
represented “above average savings,” and “6” represented “notably above average 
savings.”  This metric was coded to establish whether the prospect of saving resources 
increased the likelihood of transition. 
C. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
One limitation of this study was that the PCRs were only read and evaluated by 
one person, the author.  Thus, the research and findings are based solely on the author’s 
judgment and biases.  Another evaluator may have a completely different perspective, 
resulting in different findings.   
Another limitation of this study is the lack of standardization between the PCRs.  
For the most part, PCRs had the same general sections for the program managers to 
include details about their programs.  However, the information contained within each 
report was far from standard.  Each program manager had their different writing styles, 
backgrounds, and perspectives, all of which influenced the way they wrote the PCR.  For 
example, some reports were written in such a manner that they were too technical for the 
common person to understand.  In other reports, some details were left out, like the 
duration of the program.  The lack of details in some reports and the lack of 
standardization across all PCRs could have affected the findings of this study. 
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III. TRANSITION NOT SO BLACK AND WHITE 
Measuring transition is not such a black and white issue.  Identifying worthwhile 
metrics presents a number of unique challenges. Some of these challenges were discussed 
briefly in Chapter I, but the aim of this chapter is to discuss the complexity of this issue 
in the context of how it relates to this study.  In the first section, current measures of 
transition and the subjectivity of measuring transition will be explored.  In the second 
section, the technology transition indices will be explained and analyzed. 
A. ISSUES WITH MEASURING TRANSITION 
1. Current Measures of Transition 
As Shenhar, Dvir, Levy, and Maltz (2001) noted, projects may differ in terms of 
technology, size, complexity, risk, and other variables.  Yet much of the traditional 
project management literature has treated all of the projects the same when it comes to 
measuring project success.  Cost, schedule, and performance, as mentioned in the first 
chapter of this study, have long dominated as the measures used by the DoD and industry 
alike.  However, there are no standard ways to measure successful transition, nor would 
standard measures of successful transition be appropriate.  All organizations and 
technologies are different, which dictates different measures of success for different 
situations.  Successful transition should be defined by the organizations based on their 
circumstances and the type of technology being developed. 
2. Subjectivity of Successful Transition 
Transition is subjective because success and failure are defined through the eye of 
the beholder.  Even the time at which success is measured after introduction can effect 
whether a product is seen as successful or not (Griffin and Page, 1996).  What some 
organizations may define as a failed transition, others might define as success.  To 
illustrate this concept, one only has to look to the categories included in the database 
mentioned in the previous chapter.  
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From each PCR, data was collected on the transition details for each technology.  
Among the data collected was whether the technologies were transitioned to the 
warfighter, to a POR, to other government and DARPA S&T projects, or even 
commercial projects.  Subjectivity becomes a factor when attempting to define which 
type of transition mentioned previously constitutes success.  Is transitioning a technology 
directly into the hands of the warfighter considered more successful than a technology 
that is transitioned as a critical piece of a POR, but not to the warfighter?  It all depends 
how the organization defines success as well as how they define failure.  In order to 
control the subjective nature of transition with regard to this study, several different 
indices of technology transition and adoption were created and the results were analyzed. 
Due to the many ways to measure technology and the issue over quality versus 
quantity, subjectivity makes the issue of technology transition much more complicated. 
a. Many Ways to Measure Transition 
Bozeman (2000) used his “out the door” effectiveness criterion to describe 
the general perspective most commonly used by organizations with regards to technology 
transition.  Bozeman’s (2000) “out the door” effectiveness criterion is based on the fact 
that one organization has received the technology provided by another with no 
consideration of its impact.  One must consider the meaning of Bozeman’s definition of 
“out the door.”  This definition, which is commonly used, does not effectively measure 
transition at all.  In fact, it really only constitutes the physical definition of transition.  In 
reality, there is no standard for measuring technology transition, nor would a standard set 
of metrics for this purpose be appropriate.  The definitions of success will vary across all 
organizations and requires a distinctive set of metrics in order to be an effective gauge of 
success for each organization.  While some measures of transition could be applied to 
many organizations, technology transition is a very unique experience for different 
organizations.  The measures of success for each organization should be decided at a 
micro level, where metrics can be tailor-made to fit the circumstances surrounding the 
specific technology.  
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b. Quality Versus Quantity 
Even the way technologies transition is subject to debate.  Is successful 
transition defined as the quantity of applications a technology affects or is a single 
transition that has a profound impact on a market or the user considered more successful?  
The answer to this question depends on the way success is defined and how the 
organization itself measures transition.  For example, in the research conducted for this 
report, technologies received credit on whether they transitioned to the warfighter, 
became a significant part of a POR, transitioned to other DoD or DARPA S&T programs, 
or even transitioned outside the government to the commercial sector.  Discussions were 
held to determine if programs that were fielded to the warfighter and subsequently 
became PORs themselves should also be counted as transitioning to a POR or was it 
considered double counting?  Ultimately, it was decided that technologies transitioned to 
the warfighter that also have a significant impact on other PORs would be considered a 
candidate for both categories; otherwise the technologies would only be counted once.  
This example illustrates that this issue of technology transition is not black and white.  It 
is very subjective and should be approached as such.  
B. TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION INDICES 
In an attempt to measure and quantify the success of the AEO with regards to 
technology transition, transition indices were created to measure the different aspects of 
transition.  Multiple factors were used in the index and multiple variations of the 
transition index were created and evaluated for their effectiveness in identifying 
technologies that transitioned successfully.  The following describes the method for 
creating the indices, the top technologies identified by the indices, grouping grids 
formulated for the sake of comparing the top technologies against each other on a few 
key metrics, and a recommendation for the top indices for the AEO to use in order to 
evaluate their success as an organization at technology transition.   
1. Technology Transition Indices 
The different technology transition indices included various categories that 
factored into the score calculated by each index.  The categories included as factors in all 
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of the indices were where the technology was transitioned to and the extent of the 
transition.  More specifically, whether the technologies were transitioned to the 
warfighter, a POR, a DoD or DARPA S&T program, in a commercial capacity, or not at 
all, and the extent of the transition, either major, minor, or unknown.  Four of the indices 
also contained factors that took transition time into account as part of the calculation.  
There were eight indices in all; all giving different weights to the different factors.  The 
weights for the factors included in each index were based purely on the author’s 
judgment.  Table 4 includes each index and the weight it assigned to each factor as well 
as whether or not it took transition time into account: 
Table 4.   Technology transition indices 
 Transitioned  to: 
Extent of 
transition:  
Index Warfighter POR 
DoD 
S&T DARPA Commercial Not Major Minor Time 
1 50 30 10 10 0 0 1 0.3 N/A 
2 35 35 10 10 10 0 1 0.5 N/A 
3 35 35 10 10 10 0 1 0.5 Yes 
4 50 30 10 10 0 0 1 0.5 Yes 
5 50 50 0 0 0 0 1 0.3 N/A 
6 50 50 0 0 0 0 1 0.3 Yes 
7 20 20 20 20 20 0 1 0.3 N/A 
8 20 20 20 20 20 0 1 0.3 Yes 
 
The four indices that accounted for transition time multiplied the first two factors, 
where the technology transitioned to and the extent of the transition, by a weight assigned 
to the amount of time it took to transition the technology.  The weights used for the 








Table 5.   Weights used for transition time factor 
Months Weight 
6 months or less 1
12 months or less 0.8
18 months or less 0.6
24 months or less 0.4




Transition time was defined in this instance as the amount of time it took from 
program start to program completion.  Since not all of the PCRs contained the time it 
took from program start to completion, a system was devised to assign transition time 
weights to those technologies that transitioned but did not include program start and 
completion dates in the PCR.  This system included taking the technologies that did have 
program start and completion dates in their PCRs and calculating the amount of 
technologies that fit into each category listed in Table 5, by percentage.  The same 
percentage was then calculated out of the technologies without program start and 
completion dates to determine the amount of arbitrarily assigned weights needed for the 
unknown technologies.  For the “six months or less” and “12 months or less” categories, 
the percentage for randomly assigned weights was less than one.  Instead of rounding up 
in both of these categories, an extra weighting for the categories of “18 months or less” 
and “above 24 months” was added.  The table below shows the number of random 








Table 6.   Assigned random weights 
Months Weight Assignments per Category 
6 months or less 1 0 
12 months or less 0.8 0 
18 months or less 0.6 3 
24 months or less 0.4 3 
Above 24 months 0.2 24 
 
Once the amount of random weights per category was determined, the 30 
unknown technologies were randomly assigned a weighting using the random number 
generator in Excel.  For consistency purposes, the same assignment of weights was used 
for all technologies across all four indices that accounted for transition time as a factor.  
Each index calculated a score for every technology ranging on a scale from zero to 100.  
A zero represented the most unsuccessful transition and a score of 100 represented the 
most successful transition.  
2. Top Technologies 
A list was compiled of the top ten technologies with the highest scores in each 
index.  When there were more than ten technologies with equal scores, the additional 
technologies were included unless the number of technologies precluded it.  Such was the 
case with index five, where the top five technologies with a score of 100 were followed 
by 26 technologies with a score of 50.  Index seven also had a similar result, where after 
the top seven technologies, 16 followed with a score of 12.  After all of the top 
technologies were listed, the lists were examined for technologies that showed up in 
multiple indices.  A master list of all of the top technologies from all of the indices was 
created.  The following table lists the programs that were identified by the indices as the 









Wasp Micro Air Vehicle 8 
Active Templates 8 
Real-Time Adversarial Intelligence and Decision-Making (RAID) 7 
Video Verification of Identity Program (VIVID) 7 
Radar Scope 5 
Shape Charge Armor 5 
Dynamic Optical Tags (DOTS) 4 
Sensing and Patrolling Enablers Yielding Enhanced SASO (SPEYES) 4 
Virtual Autopsy Program 4 
Optimum Design of Tailored Topological Armors for Blast and 
Ballistic Threat Defeat 4 
Low-Cost Cruise Missile Defense (LCCMD) 4 
Fast Connectivity for Coalitions and Agents Project (Fast C2AP) 3 
Direct Thermal to Electric Conversion (DTEC) 3 
High-Frequency Active Auroral Project (HAARP) Instrument 
Completion 3 
Technology for Efficient, Agile Microsystems (TEAM) 3 
Advanced Tactical Targeting Technology (AT3) 2 
Program Composition for Embedded Systems (PCES) 2 
Self Decontaminating Surfaces (SDS) Program 2 
UltraLog 2 
Multicell and Dismounted Command and Control (M&DC2) 2 
Language and Speech Exploitation Resources (LASER) POR 1 
Boomerang 1 
Micro Air Vehicle Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration 
(MAV ACTD) 1 
Advanced Precision Optical Oscillators (aPROPOS) 1 
High Performance Corrosion Resistant Materials (HPCRM) 1 
Sticky Flare 1 
 
As the table shows, there were only two technologies that scored in the top ten of 
all indices, the Wasp Micro Air Vehicle and Active Templates.  This is significant 
because regardless of the different ways transition was evaluated across the eight indices, 
these two technologies always scored high.  They could be considered examples of 
successful transition and used as a comparison for other technologies.  It is also important 
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to note that if all of the technologies with a score of 12 had been included in Index 7, both 
the Real-Time Adversarial Intelligence and Decision-Making and the Video Verification 
of Identity technologies would also have scored in the top ten of all indices. 
3. Top Technology Grids 
In order to conduct further analysis of the top technologies identified by the 
indices, the technologies were compared against one another based on how they scored 
on a few different metrics.  The metrics for the comparison were chosen by identifying 
metrics that successfully transitioned technologies and unsuccessfully transitioned 
technologies showed significant variance.  In this instance, successful transition was 
defined as technologies that were directly transitioned to the warfighter and unsuccessful 
transition was defined as technologies that were not transitioned at all.  The average 
scores for all metrics were calculated for technologies that were successfully transitioned 
to the warfighter and compared to the average scores for all metrics of all of the 
technologies that were not transitioned. 
The four metrics used to compare the top technologies were immediate warfighter 
need, continuous versus disruptive technology, revolutionary capability, and 
technological maturity.  The comparisons were set up on grids, where one metric was on 
the horizontal axis and the other was on the vertical axis.  The technologies were plotted 
inside the grid based on how they scored on each metric.  The only exception was the 
Advanced Precision Optical Oscillators program which scored among the top 
technologies but did not have sufficient data to plot.  The following figure shows the 
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Figure 1.   Legend for grid analysis 
After all of the top technologies were plotted on each grid, the findings were 
evaluated and analyzed.  The subsequent sections discuss the findings for the three grid 
comparisons conducted on the top technologies. 
a. Immediate Warfighter Need Versus Disruptive Technology 
The following figure compares the top technologies on addressing 









































Figure 2.   Immediate warfighter need vs. disruptive technology 
As the figure shows, the top technologies are split between addressing 
immediate and future warfighter needs.  Out of the top 25 technologies, ten score 
significantly high and ten score significantly low on the immediate warfighter need 
metric which would indicate that there is not a significant relationship between 
addressing immediate versus future warfighter needs and being a successfully 
transitioned technology.  With regard to being continuous versus disruptive technology, 
the figure shows that 21 out of the 25 technologies score at least a four on this metric.  
This means that the majority of top technologies are at least somewhat disruptive in terms 
of building on existing technology. 
b. Immediate Warfighter Need Versus revolutionary Capability 
The following figure compares the top technologies on addressing 











































Figure 3.   Immediate warfighter need vs. revolutionary capability 
As was observed in the first grid, the top technologies are split between 
addressing immediate versus future warfighter needs.  However, 12 out of the 25 
technologies, scored very high in terms of providing revolutionary capability and ten 
more followed with a score of at least a four on this metric.  These findings indicate top 
technologies that transition successfully tend to provide the user, at least to some degree, 
with game-changing capability.  There is also a fairly heavy concentration of 
technologies that score the highest on both metrics.  This should be of no surprise 
considering that technologies able to address immediate warfighter needs and provide 
revolutionary capability should have no trouble successfully transitioning.  Thus, to find 
technologies that score high on these metrics among the top technologies is not 
unexpected.       
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c. Mission Fit Versus Technological Maturity 
The technological maturity metric is scored on a nine-point scale as 
opposed to the other metrics, which are scored on a seven-point scale.  The following 











































Figure 4.   Legend for grid analysis with TRL metric 
Figure 5 compares the top technologies based on how well they meet DoD 












































Figure 5.   Mission fit vs. technological maturity 
The top technologies were split again, where ten of the technologies 
scored high on the mission fit metric, ten scored low, and there were five in the middle.  
This could be explained by the fact that mission fit is a description of how well a 
technology meets DoD mission needs.  Some of the top technologies may be more 
focused toward future needs and capabilities and thus does not fit current DoD mission 
needs well.  With the technological maturity metric, out of the top 25 technologies, only 
one had a TRL lower than four.  This should come as no surprise, but the correlation 
between technological maturity and successful technology transition appears very high.  
The more technologically ready a system is, the better its chances are at successfully 
transitioning.  Again, there is a high concentration of technologies that score highly on 
both of these metrics.  This suggests a strong correlation between mission fit, 
technological maturity, and successful transition.    
 44
4. Top Index for Technology Transition 
Out of the eight original indices formulated for this research, the four using 
transition time as a factor, indices three, four, six, and eight, should not be considered as 
a top index for use.  Although decreasing the time it takes to develop and transition a 
technology is a primary objective of the AEO, it does not make a good measure for 
evaluating successful transition.  For example, the Wasp Micro Air Vehicle took 
approximately 60 months to complete.  The way the indices allotting for transition time 
were setup, this technology would receive the lowest weight possible, other than a zero 
for not transitioning.  However, one only has to look at the amount of programs this 
technology has affected and, more importantly, the impact it has had on the user in the 
field to appreciate how successfully it has transitioned.  Transition time is an extremely 
important metric for improving technology transition, but many of the top technologies 
considered successful in the index analysis were not necessarily considered quick with 
regard to technology development standards. 
Out of the four remaining indices, indices one, two, five, and seven, could all be 
used for measuring technology transition depending on the definition of transition.  All 
four of the indices weight the different types of transition differently.  Index one weights 
transition to the warfighter more heavily than any other type of transition, while putting 
significant emphasis on transitioning to a POR, less emphasis on DoD and DARPA S&T 
transitions, and no emphasis at all on commercial transitions.  Index two weights 
warfighter and POR transition equally, but above all other types, and considers the other 
three transition types equally.  Index five only weights warfighter and POR transition and 
does not consider any other types.  Index seven weights all types of transition equally.  
The indices illustrate the subjective nature of technology transition, where all value 
various strategies related to transition, differently.  It should be noted, the extent of 
transition, though important, will not be discussed in detail in this section.  Ultimately, it 
is up to the AEO to decide how much weight to assign a partial and full transition.  
For example, if the AEO considers transitioning technology to the warfighter the 
highest form of transition, an index like index one should be used to evaluate their 
programs.  If the AEO considers all forms of transition successful, they might think about 
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using index similar to seven, where no type outweighs another.  This type of index could 
be very useful in certain situations where the quantity of transitions was more important 
than the quality.  If the AEO considers all forms of transition successful, but still some 
forms more successful than others, they might consider an index like index two.  If the 
AEO believes only certain types of transition are successful, they should look into using 
an index like five, where only the most important types of transition are measured.   
In the author’s opinion, taking into account that the AEO is a DoD organization, 
giving greater weight to technologies that successfully transition to the warfighter and to 
PORs is more logical than giving equal credit to technologies that transition to other 
programs for further development, or outside of the DoD altogether.  The author is also 
of the opinion that both warfighter and POR transition should be weighted equally due to 
the fact that not all technologies are meant to be fielded to the warfighter.  Some 
technologies are not even meant to be their own POR, but still contribute significantly to 
other platforms and PORs.  The integral roles these technologies play should not be 
overlooked by weighting them less than technologies that are fielded directly to the 
warfighter.  Also, technologies that transition to other S&T programs or to the 
commercial sector also deserve credit as well.  These types of transition should be 
incorporated into the index because by being transitioned there is obviously some value 
created by that technology and it should be accounted for.  To do otherwise would 
insinuate that the technology was a waste of resources and no value was gained from it.   
For these reasons, the author would recommend using an index similar to index 
two for evaluating technology transition within the DoD.  
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IV. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
This chapter will discuss the analysis used to examine the data collected from the 
PCRs.  First, significant correlations between some of the metrics used to evaluate PCRs 
will be discussed.  Second, a regression analysis of metrics within each factor that 
influence technology transition will be discussed. Lastly, the model used to establish a 
framework for a better understanding of the factors that influence technology transition 
will be examined. 
A. CORRELATIONS 
The first part of the analysis consisted of running correlations on the database 
metrics to see which metrics used to evaluate the technologies had a significant 
relationship.  The results of the analysis are shown in Table 8 on the next page, followed 




Table 8.   Metric correlations 
 
Metrics  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Improves Warfighter Safety (1) 1.000                             
Improves Warfighter Job Satisfaction (2) 0.259 1.000                           
Addresses Immediate Warfighter Need (3) 0.462 0.323 1.000                         
Addresses Future Warfighter Need (4) -0.220 -0.039 -0.404 1.000                       
Technological Maturity (5) 0.177 0.314 0.276 -0.085 1.000                     
Perceived Usefulness (6) 0.169 0.230 0.325 -0.142 0.375 1.000                   
Continuous vs. Disruptive (7) 0.053 0.032 0.022 -0.048 0.149 0.460 1.000                 
Revolutionary Capability (8) 0.186 0.161 0.172 -0.064 0.204 0.540 0.811 1.000               
Enhances Legacy Technology (9) -0.256 0.104 -0.053 0.229 0.103 0.299 0.221 0.294 1.000             
Prepares DoD for Future (10) -0.168 0.043 -0.120 0.155 0.203 0.433 0.652 0.612 0.483 1.000           
Mission Fit (11) 0.137 0.126 0.383 -0.270 0.275 0.616 0.511 0.614 0.374 0.504 1.000         
Flexibility (12) -0.012 0.014 -0.061 -0.162 -0.122 0.221 0.298 0.385 0.178 0.460 0.366 1.000       
Adaptable (13) -0.107 -0.058 -0.071 -0.068 -0.134 0.130 0.275 0.278 0.178 0.396 0.325 0.680 1.000     
Interoperability (14) -0.020 -0.072 -0.010 -0.164 -0.170 0.144 0.213 0.247 0.050 0.242 0.153 0.433 0.367 1.000   




1. Expected Correlations 
Addresses immediate warfighter need has a fairly significant positive correlation 
with both the improves warfighter safety and improves warfighter job satisfaction 
metrics.  This should come as no surprise considering that most technologies aimed at 
improving warfighter safety or job satisfaction are probably based on requirements 
emerging from problems experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan, i.e. immediate warfighter 
needs.  It is also expected that addresses immediate warfighter need has a rather negative 
correlation with addresses future warfighter need.   Though immediate and future 
warfighter needs can sometimes coincide, more often than not they do not, as is reflected 
in the analysis. 
The continuous versus disruptive metric, which evaluates technologies on the 
extent to which they build on existing technologies, has a very significant correlation 
with the metric that rates a technology on the degree to which it provides a revolutionary 
capability.  This correlation between these two metrics is the highest out of all of the 
metrics.  The high significance of this relationship is expected because technologies that 
were rated as being continuous, a technology that builds incrementally and improves on 
an existing technology, would most likely provide a capability that was not revolutionary 
or game changing.  In the same regard, technologies that were rated as disruptive, a new 
technology that has unexpected benefits, would most likely provide a revolutionary 
capability, and thus would receive a high rating for this metric.  These two categories also 
correlate significantly with the prepares DoD for the future metric.  This is due to the fact 
that disruptive technologies providing revolutionary capability would help to prepare the 
DoD for future missions that are not yet fully realized. 
Adaptive to user needs and flexible in mission use also share a very significant 
relationship, the second highest out of all the metrics.  This is also an expected result.  
Technologies that display a high adaptability to user needs should also be very flexible 
with regards to mission use because technologies that are very adaptable can probably 
perform multiple missions.      
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2. Unexpected Correlations 
Addresses future warfighter need did not show a significant relationship with the 
two metrics that evaluated technologies on being continuous versus disruptive and the 
extent to which the capability provided by the technologies was revolutionary.  A strong 
correlation should exist between these metrics because as time progresses and technology 
makes new advances, technology becomes more disruptive and tends to provide 
capabilities that were not previously available.  Furthermore, future warfighter needs will 
most likely be different from immediate warfighter needs, where different technological 
solutions will be required to meet new enemies.   For these reasons, the relationship 
between these metrics should be highly correlated.  
Enhances legacy technology also had some unexpected correlations.  First, it 
shows a somewhat significant, negative correlation with the improves warfighter safety 
metric.  This is unexpected because logically, one would expect that at least some 
technologies aimed at making the warfighter safer would seem to be improvements to 
existing technologies.  This data suggests that this relationship is negative, which is a 
confusing result.  Secondly, enhances legacy technology also has practically no 
correlation with immediate warfighter need, which is also puzzling.  Immediate 
warfighter needs are usually satisfied with continuous technologies that incrementally 
build on the capability of existing systems.  In essence, if the current technology that the 
warfighter possesses is not giving them the needed capability, enhancements to that 
technology are often made to yield the desired performance.  One would think that at 
least a small relationship would exist between these two metrics, but the data implies 
otherwise.   
Prepares DoD for the future and addresses future warfighter need also has a 
relationship that is less significant than expected.  One would think that these two metrics 
would be highly correlated since addressing future warfighter needs would also be a 
direct method of preparing the DoD for the future.  Technologies that address future  
warfighter needs would also pave the way for other similar systems and prepare the DoD 
infrastructure to receive such technologies.  Thus, to find no relationship between these 
metrics is odd. 
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Flexibility in mission use, adaptive to user needs, and interoperability with 
existing technologies are all very poorly related to improves warfighter job satisfaction.  
This is very unexpected because technologies that are flexible, adaptive, and 
interoperable with existing systems should be very highly correlated with improving 
warfighter job satisfaction since these metrics essentially measure ease of use. However, 
these very low correlations might be explained by the fact that out of all the metrics, 
these three metrics had the highest amount of “N/A” ratings due to the fact that certain 
technologies were very hard to evaluate in these areas. 
3. Mission Fit 
It should be noted that the mission fit metric is significantly correlated to many of 
the other metrics used to evaluate the technologies. Among the most significant 
correlations with mission fit are perceived usefulness, continuous versus disruptive, 
revolutionary capability, and prepares DoD for the future metrics.  All of these metrics 
should be significantly correlated with mission fit because they all are measures of how 
well a technology fits an existing DoD mission.  For example, with perceived usefulness, 
if the technology was evaluated as very useful, there is most likely a DoD mission that 
the technology is particularly suited for.  The degree to which a technology is considered 
continuous or disruptive also correlates significantly with how well it will fit into an 
existing DoD mission.  If the technology is too disruptive, it will not fit existing missions 
because it probably will provide new capability that a mission may not exist for.       
A couple of metrics that mission fit is not significantly correlated to are improves 
warfighter safety and improves warfighter job satisfaction.  The fact that these metrics are 
not significantly correlated suggests that DoD missions are not focused on making 
warfighter jobs better or the user safer.  Rather, as far as technologies are concerned, 
accomplishing a certain objective or providing a specific capability are most likely the 
concern.     
It is also important to note that the correlations reported do strongly suggest that 
there are significant overlaps between some of the metrics.  This indicates that all of the  
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metrics are not independent of one another.  Therefore, future statistical work should 
include a factor analysis to examine if the metrics can be reduced to a smaller number of 
underlying measures.     
B. REGRESSION MODELS 
1. Methodology 
In order to find metrics to conduct regression analysis on, indices were created to 
try to identify the most successfully transitioned technologies.  Originally there were 
eight indices, which were narrowed down to four.  The four indices that were not chosen 
for regression analysis were the indices that considered time as a factor.  They were 
excluded primarily because, in the model used in this study, time did not make a valid 
factor for evaluating successful transition.  Using the four final indices as the dependent 
variable and all of the metrics as the independent variables, four initial regression models 
were created.  In order to conduct the regressions, all metrics for the technologies had to 
contain a value.  Thus, it was necessary to omit some metrics and technologies in the 
database that contained many “N/A” or “TBR” values.  For this reason, the initial 
regression was done with 101 technologies in order to include 11 metrics.  This differs 
from the 103 technologies used for the other regressions run with less metrics.  From the 
initial regressions, key metrics were identified and selected for further analysis. 
The AEO Measurement Model will be discussed in the next section of this 
chapter, but for the sake of comprehension, it will be briefly described here.  The AEO 
Measurement Model is made up of three factors: worthiness, DoD market factors, and the 
DARPA development process.  When combined, all of these factors influence the 
effectiveness of technology transition.  After reviewing the initial regression analysis, 
certain metrics were chosen to represent two of the factors in the AEO Measurement 
Model.  Technical maturity, continuous versus disruptive, and revolutionary capability 
were the three metrics that were chosen to represent the worthiness factor.  Immediate 
warfighter need and mission fit were selected to represent the DoD market factors.  To 
choose these metrics, the averages for all the metrics were taken from technologies that 
transitioned to either the warfighter, a POR, or in some cases both, and compared to 
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technologies that did not transition at all.  The metrics listed above were selected because 
their averages showed significant differences between the technologies that transitioned 
and those that did not. 
In the next round of regression analysis, first, the three worthiness metrics, 
technical maturity, continuous versus disruptive, and revolutionary capability, were run 
against the top four indices, where the indices were the dependent variables and the 
metrics were the independent variables.  Subsequently, the two DoD market factors 
metrics, immediate warfighter need and mission fit, were also run against the top four 
indices, where the top four transition indices served as the dependent variables and the 
metrics were the independent variables.  After analyzing the results from these 
regressions, all of the metrics were included in the same regression and run against the 
top four transition indices, where the indices were the dependent variables and the 
metrics were the independent variables.  The results of all the regressions were analyzed 
and compared against each other.  The results are discussed below. 
2. Findings 
 All four of the initial regressions run showed a significant relationship between 
each of the four final indices and the metrics technological maturity and mission fit. The 
r-squared values were fairly significant as well, indicating that the metrics used are 
somewhat good at predicting technology transition.  The results of the analysis, the p-
values for the technological maturity and mission fit metrics along with the R Square 
values for each regression, are shown in Table 9.  The full regression outputs are included 
in Appendix A of this study. 
Table 9.   Regression with indices, technological maturity, and mission fit 
Metrics (P-values) Index #1 Index #2 Index #5 Index #7 
Technological Maturity 0.00164 0.00101 0.01907 0.00018 
Mission Fit 0.00464 0.00041 0.00340 0.00027 
R Square Value 0.48760 0.46393 0.42407 0.45891 
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In the second round of regressions, the individual metrics that were selected as 
representatives for two of the three factors influencing technology transition in the AEO 
Measurement Model were analyzed using regression.  In all four regressions with the 
worthiness metrics, only the technological maturity metric was significant to all four 
indices.  The results of the analysis, the p-values for the worthiness metrics and the R 
Square values for each regression, are shown in Table 10.  The full regression outputs are 
included in Appendix B of this study. 
Table 10.   Regression with worthiness metrics 
Metrics (P-values) Index #1  Index #2 Index #5  Index #7 
Technological Maturity 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
Continuous vs. Disruptive 0.51553 0.26445 0.74893 0.07406 
Revolutionary Capability 0.28466 0.75888 0.36378 0.87745 
R Square Value 0.34857 0.32646 0.26961 0.32044 
 
When analyzing the DoD market factors metrics, only the mission fit metric was 
significant to all four indices; immediate warfighter need was significant only for index 
seven.  The results of the analysis, the p-values for the DoD market factors metrics and 
the R Square values for each regression, are shown in Table 11.  The full regression 
outputs are included in Appendix C of this study. 
Table 11.   Regression with DoD market factors metrics 
Metrics (P-values) Index #1  Index #2 Index #5  Index #7 
Immediate Warfighter Need 0.65181 0.11955 0.45902 0.02894 
Mission Fit 0.00000 0.00000 0.00001 0.00000 
R Square Value 0.33008 0.30918 0.29360 0.26388 
 
In the third round of regressions, the five metrics from the two AEO Measurement 
Model factors were analyzed against all four indices.  The results were consistent with 
the previous two increments of regression analysis, where the only two significant 
metrics across all four indices were technological maturity and mission fit.  The results of 
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the analysis, the p-values for the five metrics and the R Square values for each regression, 
are shown in Table 12.  The full regression outputs are included in Appendix D of this 
study. 
Table 12.   Regression with worthiness and DoD market factors metrics 
Metrics (P-values) Index #1  Index #2 Index #5  Index #7 
Technological Maturity 0.00002 0.00003 0.00063 0.00003 
Continuous vs. Disruptive 0.23662 0.11949 0.44149 0.03719 
Revolutionary Capability 0.76780 0.37087 0.72519 0.30607 
Immediate Warfighter Need 0.82489 0.17069 0.57509 0.04083 
Mission Fit 0.00142 0.00015 0.00121 0.00024 
R Square Value 0.45541 0.43727 0.37896 0.41270 
 
The trend of the technological maturity and mission fit metrics having 
significance in all regressions performed suggests that these two metrics are consistently 
strong predictors of transition across all of the models attempted in this study.  Another 
noteworthy finding that emerged as a result of the regression analysis is that the r-square 
value for the metrics of the two AEO Measurement Model factors was somewhat 
significant in the individual regressions that were conducted, but became more significant 
as all five metrics were combined.  The R Square value increased significantly, indicating 
that these five metrics, when combined, are a better predictor of technology transition 
than as individual factors.   
3. Is Creating an Index to Measure Transition a Good Idea? 
The findings in the regression analysis should come as no surprise to DARPA 
program managers.  They confirm that the technologies that transition and become 
adopted by their users typically have a high degree of readiness and fit well with a DoD 
mission.  However, the findings within the regression analysis pose an interesting 
dilemma.  With the technological maturity and mission fit metrics appearing as very 
significant predictors of technology transition, instead of attempting to create an index 
that identifies metrics that will predict successful transition, maybe technologies should 
be evaluated on readiness.  Technological maturity, a measure of the readiness of a 
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technology to be transitioned, and mission fit, a measure of existing need for the 
technology, are both good indicators of whether or not a technology is prepared for 
transition.  The DoD can control, to a certain extent, the TRL of a technology by 
dedicating more resources to the development of the technology.  Though the DoD 
cannot control mission need, it can select technologies to develop based on whether they 
meet DoD mission needs.   
Evaluating technologies solely on readiness would be difficult for an organization 
like DARPA to do.  First, DARPA consistently develops technologies with very low 
TRLs.  Part of their purpose as an organization is to push the technological envelope and 
that often requires developing very immature technologies.  Secondly, DARPA cannot 
focus primarily on DoD mission needs because that would require them to focus on the 
near-term, immediate needs of the DoD.  Though they do this on a limited basis, part of 
their purpose as an organization is to try and develop technological solutions to long-term 
problems and advance the state of the art.   DARPA could not fulfill this purpose if they 
only focused on developing technologies to meet current DoD mission needs. 
A surprising result of the regression analysis is that once technological maturity 
and mission fit are included in the regression models, the rest of the metrics turn 
insignificant.  This result suggests that these two factors dominate transition and that 
most of the other metrics do not matter.  Further statistical analysis should be conducted 
on this data to explore possible reasons why this occurs.   
C. THEORETICAL MODEL OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION 
The AEO Measurement Model used to analyze the data collected from the PCRs 
consists of three separate factors that influence technology transition.  The three factors 
affecting AEO technology transition are the merit of the technology itself (worthiness), 
the process used to develop the technology (development process), and the market factors 




























Figure 6.   AEO measurement model 
The three factors are discussed in more detail in the subsequent sections. 
1. Technology Worthiness 
The technology worthiness factor represents the merit of the technology itself.  
Obviously, technologies that demonstrate a revolutionary capability or significantly 
enhance an already existing capability would transition more easily than technologies that 
do not, but a technology’s worthiness can be evaluated on several different metrics.  To 
identify the metrics to gauge the worthiness of the technology, the data collected from the 
PCRs were analyzed by creating different indices to identify the top technologies.  The 
top technologies were then compared to technologies that did not transition.  The 
worthiness metrics that showed a significant variance between successful and 
unsuccessful technologies were chosen to represent technology worthiness in the AEO 
Measurement Model.  It is important to note that many metrics can be used to evaluate 
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technology worthiness.  The most appropriate metrics will vary depending on the 
situation, organizations involved, as well as the types of technologies being evaluated. 
The three metrics identified from the analysis for the technology worthiness factor 
in the AEO Measurement Model were the metric used to evaluate the degree to which the 
technology would build on existing technology (continuous vs. disruptive), the metric 
used to evaluate the degree to which the technology provided revolutionary capability 
(impact potential), and the technological maturity metric used to assess the estimated 
TRL of the technology.  These metrics represent the quality of the technology, where 
quality does not necessarily constitute highest scores in all three of these categories, but 
the right combination of metrics that enhance the value of the technology.  The higher the 
technology’s quality, the more like it is to be adopted and transitioned. 
To some extent, organizations can increase the quality of a technology by 
dedicating more resources to its development.  Resources could include monetary, 
personnel, expertise, manufacturing processes or capability, to increase the TRL or 
readiness of a technology to be transitioned.  In some cases however, no amount of extra 
time, effort, or money will be enough to advance the technology far enough for transition. 
2. DARPA Development Process 
The DARPA development process factor represents the process by which 
DARPA develops and fields their technologies.  This factor might include having 
systems in place to interpret the needs of the warfighter and to ensure the people with the 
appropriate authority are aware of the technologies being developed by DARPA.  The 
PCRs contained information regarding the development of technologies, not the 
processes by which they were developed and transitioned.  For this reason, the 
technologies were not evaluated on this basis and no metrics were included in the 
database to examine DARPA’s development process.  However, the initial interviews 
with acquisition professionals did offer insight into potential process issues that would 
most likely affect technology transition.  An example includes access to the end user. 
Access to the end user refers to the degree of involvement the user has in the 
development of the technology.  As indicated in a few of the interviews by acquisition 
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professionals from the conventional acquisition community, end user involvement 
usually occurs by proxy; where a member from headquarters or command represents the 
user during the development process.  Without direct feedback from the real user, 
programs may suffer from the lack of critical inputs needed to design and develop a 
system that meets user expectations.  To improve technology adoption and transition, 
organizations could amend their processes to permit direct contact with the true user, 
allowing them real-time feedback in order to develop a system that better meets user 
needs, while increasing the odds of successful transition. 
For an organization like DARPA, access to the end user is critically important 
because innovation happens through close working relationships with the end user, where 
having intimate knowledge of end user needs helps to close the information gap between 
them and the developing organization.  DARPA can affect this by setting up 
infrastructure, processes, and programs that allow program managers access to the end 
user.  As described on the AEO website (2010), one of their strategies is to establish 
strong organizational relationships connecting warfighters to DARPA’s performers and 
demonstrate the transition worthiness of DARPA technology by rigorously assessing 
their strengths and limitations.  
Development process cannot account for all innovation.  Innovation also happens 
through users, where users will take a technology and use it in ways never expected nor 
intended by its developer.  As indicated by a couple of the interviews, special operations 
forces are a good illustration of this type of community.  The creativity and innovation 
displayed by this category of user cannot be predicted.  Thus, even the best process 
cannot account for it because the user themselves cannot account for it until the 
technology reaches their hands.  Program managers cannot account or plan for something 
that is impossible to predict. 
The processes organizations use to develop and transition technology can be 
controlled, to a certain degree, by the organizations that use them.  Organizations can 
easily control the processes they put into place, but cannot control whether the processes 
are accepted and used by the organizational culture.  Organizations can become 
entrenched in the processes they use, where removing them can become a significant 
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challenge and not always successful. With technology transition, it is important to put 
effective processes into place that promote transition because organizational inertia can 
make them difficult to change or remove if they are ineffective. 
Part of the development process includes making the receiving organization ready 
to accept the technology.  By preparing the receiving organizations, the odds of 
successfully transitioning a technology will increase.  An example might be if the 
technology requires certain infrastructure to support the technology, the receiving 
organization would need to have that infrastructure in place upon receiving the 
technology.  The onus of post-delivery requirements falls on both the developer of the 
technology as well as the recipient.  Processes should be in place to ensure a seamless 
transfer from one organization to another.  
3. DoD Market Factors 
Unlike the other two factors in the AEO Measurement Model, the DoD market 
factors are driven by external forces and cannot be controlled by DARPA in any way.  
Some of these factors include competition in the market, demand of the user, DoD 
budget, mission needs, and priorities.  All of these factors represent the market pull, or 
demand for the technology.  The greater the demand for the technology, the more likely it 
is to successfully transition.  To evaluate the demand for the technologies, metrics were 
required that would indicate the level to which the technologies met the needs of the 
DoD.  As with the technology worthiness factor, the data collected from the PCRs were 
analyzed by creating different indices to identify the top technologies.  The demand 
metrics of the successfully transitioned technologies that showed the most variance when 
compared to the unsuccessfully transitioned technologies were picked to represent the 
DoD market factors in the AEO Measurement Model.  Again, it is important to note that 
many metrics could represent DoD demand and that the metrics chosen for this model 
may not be appropriate in the context of other situations.  
The two metrics used to represent DoD market factors were the extent to which 
the technology fit the mission needs of the DoD, as well as the extent to which the 
technology addresses an immediate warfighter need.  These metrics are good 
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representations of DoD demand because demand is very difficult to predict.  The 
immediate needs of the warfighter may or may not align with the future needs of the 
warfighter, but current warfighter needs are known.  What the warfighter needs in the 
future is not.  A significant factor to transition is timing, and since tomorrow’s demand is 
hard to predict, the current needs of the DoD should provide an accurate indicator of how 
technology transition is affected by demand. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
To summarize the recommendations and findings of this study, a success map was 
developed for the AEO.  The success map is attributed to Neely, Adams, and Kennerly 
(as cited in Perkmann, Neely, and Walsh, 2010, May).   As Bremser and Barsky describe 
it (as cited in Perkmann, Neely, and Walsh, 2010, May), a success map articulates a 
simple theory of how the alliance between technology transition and the AEO works and 
identifies the cause and effect relationships underpinning success.  The success map 
























































Figure 7.   AEO success map 
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Brown (as cited in Perkmann, Nelly, and Walsh, 2010, May) described four stages 
in an alliance: input, in-process, output, and impact, as are shown on the success map 
above.  The white boxes represent the success map, while the dark boxes contain 
appropriate measures for the four different stages.  
1. Inputs 
While inputs constitute the first stage in the process, a first necessary ingredient 
for a successful alliance is the mobilization of adequate resources (Perkmann, Nelly, and 
Walsh, 2010, May).  The resources required for success in the AEO success map are the 
program funding, program managers, and the technologies.  Funding for DARPA/AEO 
programs comes from the DoD budget.  Successful transition can be influenced, to some 
extent, by the amount of funding allocated to the program.  As described earlier in this 
report, competition exists, and is increasing, between DoD organizations for funding as 
the use of supplemental appropriations begins to decrease.  For the AEO, success is 
dependent on securing enough funding to execute programs and continue to develop the 
processes necessary to achieve the AEO thrust initiatives. 
Another one of the ingredients to DARPA’s success is their highly qualified 
program managers.  DARPA draws talented and intelligent program managers from all 
aspects of various professional communities.  Working for DARPA represents a pinnacle 
professional achievement for many; where program managers are expected to be 
innovative and push the technological envelope.  DARPA’s ability to attract very capable 
program managers and subject matter experts to execute their programs is a big driver for 
success. 
The phrase “DARPA hard” is used to describe challenges that are seemingly 
insurmountable from a technological perspective.  DARPA has earned this homage 
because they tackle some of the most difficult S&T challenges that exist.  Technologies, 
the third input listed in the success map, are never in short supply.  As long as technology 
is needed, there will always be new technological advancements to be made.  Access to 
technologies should not be difficult to maintain, but will be required to ensure successful 




The three elements that make up the input stage are necessary for the next stage in 
the success map, the in-process stage.  In the AEO’s success map, the in-process stage is 
made up of three elements: program management best practices, the AEO thrust areas, 
and end user involvement.  The availability of funding and astute program managers help 
to develop program management (PM) best practices.  Resources fund the research, 
development, and institution of processes and infrastructure that is proven to be 
successful in transitioning technology.  Program managers play a significant role in 
creating PM best practices by documenting and sharing lessons learned to create 
continuity among DARPA program managers.  Finding the successful development 
methods and implementing them within the AEO is critical to their success as an 
organization in transitioning technologies.  Equally as critical is keeping continuity and 
continually looking for ways to improve the processes in place. 
Program managers and sufficient funding are also required to achieve the AEO 
thrust areas.  The AEO thrust areas represent organizational goals related to specific 
mission areas.  Program managers must buy in to these goals and be dedicated to them in 
order for the organization to be successful.  Sufficient funding is needed to establish the 
infrastructure and processes to help the AEO program managers accomplish the goals.  
The thrust areas also provide vision to the AEO program managers.  Vision is crucial to 
achieving successful transition in any organization in order to motivate employees and 
provide purpose to their jobs. 
End user involvement is a critical element to successful technology transition 
affected by both program managers and technologies.  Program managers must establish 
productive work relationships with the end user throughout the entire development 
process.  By doing so, communication can be established to ensure real time inputs into 
the system by the operators who use it.  This relationship helps the program manager 
understand the user’s requirements for the system, which results in the technology 
meeting user expectations and increases the probability it will successfully transition.  
End users must also have access to the technologies in order to provide input into their  
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development.  Getting the technologies into the hands of the operator early and often will 
result in a better developed product, which will increase the chances for successful 
transition.  
3. Output 
In the third stage, the above in-process activities should subsequently lead to the 
generation of actual outputs (Perkmann, Nelly, and Walsh, 2010, May).  Creating PM 
best practices and implementing the AEO thrust areas should produce an improved 
transition infrastructure, which will in turn lead to increased technological maturity.  End 
user involvement should result in an increase in user-sponsored projects because it 
demonstrates a commitment by the AEO to delivering quality systems to the user.  End 
user involvement will also lead to new technology concepts because by granting the user 
access to the technology throughout the development process, the user will come up with 
ways to use the technology that the developers never thought of.  In doing so, new 
technology concepts are developed that will lead to other projects.  Implementation of 
thrust initiatives and end user involvement generates an increase in the degree to which 
the technologies fit DoD mission needs.  The AEO thrust areas address current warfighter 
needs, while direct user input informs developers of ways the technology can better meet 
their needs in the field.   
4. Impact 
In the final stage, the exploitation of these outputs should lead to a range of 
impacts (Perkmann, Nelly, and Walsh, 2010, May).  Improved transition infrastructure, 
increased technological maturity, and an increase in user-sponsored projects, will all 
improve the transition rate of the AEO.  By improving the transition infrastructure, better 
processes and methods for transition will be developed and used, resulting in an increased 
transition rate.  Increased technological maturity increases the technology’s readiness.  
More technologies with higher technological maturity will transition more often than 
technologies with low technological maturity.  Thus, technologies with higher 
technological maturity will lead to better transition rates.  An increase in user-sponsored 
projects indicates that the user will be more committed to developing the technology for 
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two reasons.  First, the user has money invested and wants to ensure the technology 
provides a return on investment.  Second, an investment by the user usually indicates the 
user is interested in what the technology can offer them.  For these two reasons, the user 
is likely to stay committed to the project, leading to an increase in the rate of programs 
that transition. 
Improved transition capability is a direct impact of an improved transition 
infrastructure.  Better processes and program management practices will make the AEO a 
more capable organization with regard to transition.  Improved infrastructure also makes 
program managers more capable.  It can eliminate inefficiencies or impediments that 
employees encounter on a daily basis.  Eradicating these obstructions can improve the 
work environment by making it less stressful for the employees, leading to increased 
productivity.    
Identifying new technology concepts help to prepare the DoD for the future.  
Users are inventive.  When a user is given a technology to test, often times unexpected 
results occur.  Users will utilize the technology in ways never intended by the developer.  
A technology with only one initial mission becomes multi-faceted and able to adapt to 
other mission scenarios.  The manner in which users choose to apply a new technology 
could identify new technology concepts for other programs or even uncover new 
capability gaps that the user or developer never knew existed.  This dynamic helps to 
prepare the AEO, and on a broader level, the DoD, for the next iteration of the 
technology. 
Both new technology concepts and increased fit to DoD mission needs will help 
to make transition more adaptive and flexible to user needs.  New technology concepts 
are born out of new needs that emerge as a result of user involvement in the development 
process.  Due to user involvement, the developers must remain adaptable and flexible in 
order to incorporate changes to meet the user’s requirements.  DoD mission needs tend to 
change with the emergence of new threats.  The AEO transition process will have to 
remain flexible in order to adapt to these changes.  Meeting DoD mission needs will drive 
them to do so. 
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B. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study has highlighted areas for further study listed below: 
• An exclusive assessment of the process factor in the AEO Measurement 
Model, specifically interviewing DARPA program managers to provide 
further fidelity to the Model. 
• Exploring a more comprehensive list of technology transition indices to 
attempt to find better predictors of technology transition with input from 
DARPA on their organizational definition of what constitutes transition. 
• Interviewing DARPA program managers to ascertain the elements of the 
transition success map from their perspective in order to compare with the 
one included in this study.   
• A multi-case study between the top technologies found with the transition 
indices used in this study. 
• A detailed comparison and analysis of the three most successful transitions 
as defined by DARPA.  
• Refinement of the database included in this study to include adding or 
deleting metrics or reevaluating all 116 technologies. 
• Further statistical analysis of the database in attempt to discover other 
significant metrics of technology transition or further explain the 
significant factors discovered in this study. 
C. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, measuring technology transition remains a very complicated 
problem.  Where most organizations look outward for appropriate measures to apply to 
their situation, others rely completely on the traditional measures-cost, schedule, and 
performance-without ever questioning whether or not those measures accurately evaluate 
their programs.  Given the multidimensional nature of transition, measurement systems 
should be approached from an internal review of the measurable data available and 
considered for which metrics would be most appropriate to their circumstances rather 
than approaching it with a “one size fits all” mentality.  The efforts of this study have 
attempted to offer a tailored set of measure that might be well suited to DARPA AEO’s 
mission based on the PCR analysis. 
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APPENDIX A.  REGRESSION OUTPUT FOR ALL METRICS & INDICES 
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.69828        
R Square 0.48760        
Adjusted R Square 0.43066        
Standard Error 17.77675        
Observations 101        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F    
Regression 10 27064.34 2706.43 8.56 0.00    
Residual 90 28441.15 316.01      
Total 100 55505.49          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% 
Upper 
95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Adoption Index #1 -45.53039 14.81275 -3.07373 0.00280 -74.95850 -16.10227 -74.95850 -16.10227 
Continuous vs. Disruptive 2.01044 1.69734 1.18447 0.23935 -1.36161 5.38250 -1.36161 5.38250 
Rev. Capability -1.56525 2.01855 -0.77544 0.44011 -5.57545 2.44494 -5.57545 2.44494 
Tech Maturity 4.84370 1.49209 3.24626 0.00164 1.87941 7.80799 1.87941 7.80799 
Mission Fit 5.86064 2.01817 2.90393 0.00464 1.85119 9.87010 1.85119 9.87010 
Immediate W/F Need -0.70909 1.79001 -0.39614 0.69294 -4.26525 2.84707 -4.26525 2.84707 
User Safety 0.70394 1.06449 0.66129 0.51012 -1.41086 2.81874 -1.41086 2.81874 
Job Satisfaction 0.63679 1.17006 0.54424 0.58762 -1.68773 2.96132 -1.68773 2.96132 
Future W/F Need 0.43812 1.69156 0.25900 0.79622 -2.92246 3.79870 -2.92246 3.79870 
Perceived Usefulness 2.75306 2.22831 1.23549 0.21986 -1.67387 7.17998 -1.67387 7.17998 
Legacy Technology -0.57356 1.17660 -0.48748 0.62711 -2.91108 1.76395 -2.91108 1.76395 
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APPENDIX A.   REGRESSION OUTPUT FOR ALL METRICS & INDICES (CONTINUED) 
 
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.68113        
R Square 0.46393        
Adjusted R Square 0.40437        
Standard Error 17.14192        
Observations 101        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F    
Regression 10 22887.46 2288.75 7.79 0.00    
Residual 90 26446.07 293.85      
Total 100 49333.54          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% 
Upper 
95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Adoption Index #2 -36.31400 14.28377 -2.54233 0.01272 -64.69119 -7.93681 -64.69119 -7.93681 
Continuous vs. Disruptive 2.66495 1.63672 1.62822 0.10697 -0.58669 5.91658 -0.58669 5.91658 
Rev. Capability -2.40395 1.94646 -1.23504 0.22003 -6.27094 1.46303 -6.27094 1.46303 
Tech Maturity 4.89046 1.43880 3.39898 0.00101 2.03202 7.74889 2.03202 7.74889 
Mission Fit 7.14593 1.94610 3.67192 0.00041 3.27965 11.01220 3.27965 11.01220 
Immediate W/F Need -1.87557 1.72608 -1.08660 0.28011 -5.30474 1.55360 -5.30474 1.55360 
User Safety 0.59411 1.02648 0.57878 0.56418 -1.44517 2.63338 -1.44517 2.63338 
Job Satisfaction 0.08049 1.12827 0.07134 0.94329 -2.16102 2.32200 -2.16102 2.32200 
Future W/F Need 0.93641 1.63115 0.57408 0.56735 -2.30417 4.17698 -2.30417 4.17698 
Perceived Usefulness 1.19319 2.14873 0.55530 0.58007 -3.07564 5.46202 -3.07564 5.46202 
Legacy Technology 0.04949 1.13458 0.04362 0.96530 -2.20455 2.30354 -2.20455 2.30354 
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APPENDIX A.   REGRESSION OUTPUT FOR ALL METRICS & INDICES (CONTINUED) 
 
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.65121        
R Square 0.42407        
Adjusted R Square 0.36008        
Standard Error 21.90836        
Observations 101        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F    
Regression 10 31807.60 3180.76 6.63 0.00    
Residual 90 43197.84 479.98      
Total 100 75005.45          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% 
Upper 
95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Adoption Index #5 -42.70894 18.25548 -2.33951 0.02152 -78.97663 -6.44125 -78.97663 -6.44125 
Continuous vs. Disruptive 1.71968 2.09183 0.82210 0.41320 -2.43610 5.87546 -2.43610 5.87546 
Rev. Capability -2.39676 2.48769 -0.96345 0.33790 -7.33899 2.54547 -7.33899 2.54547 
Tech Maturity 4.38986 1.83887 2.38725 0.01907 0.73661 8.04310 0.73661 8.04310 
Mission Fit 7.48293 2.48723 3.00854 0.00340 2.54161 12.42425 2.54161 12.42425 
Immediate W/F Need -1.98039 2.20603 -0.89771 0.37173 -6.36306 2.40229 -6.36306 2.40229 
User Safety 1.72536 1.31190 1.31516 0.19180 -0.88096 4.33167 -0.88096 4.33167 
Job Satisfaction 0.86743 1.44200 0.60155 0.54899 -1.99734 3.73221 -1.99734 3.73221 
Future W/F Need 0.20163 2.08471 0.09672 0.92316 -3.94000 4.34327 -3.94000 4.34327 
Perceived Usefulness 2.79178 2.74620 1.01660 0.31207 -2.66403 8.24759 -2.66403 8.24759 
Legacy Technology -0.68576 1.45006 -0.47292 0.63742 -3.56655 2.19504 -3.56655 2.19504 
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APPENDIX A.   REGRESSION OUTPUT FOR ALL METRICS & INDICES (CONTINUED) 
 
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.67743        
R Square 0.45891        
Adjusted R Square 0.39879        
Standard Error 16.52333        
Observations 101        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F    
Regression 10 20840.12 2084.01 7.63 0.00    
Residual 90 24571.84 273.02      
Total 100 45411.96          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% 
Upper 
95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Adoption Index #7 -37.46530 13.76832 -2.72112 0.00781 -64.81847 -10.11213 -64.81847 -10.11213 
Continuous vs. Disruptive 3.60855 1.57766 2.28728 0.02452 0.47426 6.74285 0.47426 6.74285 
Rev. Capability -1.96158 1.87622 -1.04550 0.29859 -5.68902 1.76586 -5.68902 1.76586 
Tech Maturity 5.41947 1.38688 3.90767 0.00018 2.66419 8.17476 2.66419 8.17476 
Mission Fit 7.11782 1.87588 3.79440 0.00027 3.39107 10.84457 3.39107 10.84457 
Immediate W/F Need -1.70900 1.66380 -1.02717 0.30709 -5.01442 1.59642 -5.01442 1.59642 
User Safety -0.41998 0.98944 -0.42446 0.67224 -2.38567 1.54571 -2.38567 1.54571 
Job Satisfaction -0.45289 1.08756 -0.41643 0.67809 -2.61351 1.70773 -2.61351 1.70773 
Future W/F Need 2.07485 1.57229 1.31963 0.19030 -1.04878 5.19848 -1.04878 5.19848 
Perceived Usefulness -0.42012 2.07119 -0.20284 0.83972 -4.53490 3.69467 -4.53490 3.69467 
Legacy Technology 0.80272 1.09364 0.73399 0.46486 -1.36998 2.97542 -1.36998 2.97542 
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APPENDIX B.  REGRESSION OUTPUT FOR WORTHINESS METRICS & INDICES 
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.59040        
R Square 0.34857        
Adjusted R Square 0.32883        
Standard Error 19.25005        
Observations 103        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 3 19630.06 6543.35 17.66 0.00    
Residual 99 36685.86 370.56      
Total 102 56315.92          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Adoption Index #1 -42.39943 9.68208 -4.37916 0.00003 -61.61078 -23.18808 -61.61078 -23.18808 
Tech. Maturity 8.60264 1.30249 6.60474 0.00000 6.01821 11.18708 6.01821 11.18708 
Continuous vs. Disruptive 1.12274 1.72044 0.65259 0.51553 -2.29098 4.53646 -2.29098 4.53646 
Revolutionary Capability 2.11834 1.96922 1.07573 0.28466 -1.78902 6.02571 -1.78902 6.02571 
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APPENDIX B.   REGRESSION OUTPUT FOR WORTHINESS METRICS & INDICES (CONTINUED) 
 
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.57137        
R Square 0.32646        
Adjusted R Square 0.30605        
Standard Error 18.62033        
Observations 103        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 3 16637.29 5545.76 16.00 0.00    
Residual 99 34324.97 346.72      
Total 102 50962.26          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Adoption Index #2 -33.57882 9.36536 -3.58543 0.00052 -52.16172 -14.99591 -52.16172 -14.99591 
Tech. Maturity 8.10011 1.25989 6.42923 0.00000 5.60022 10.60000 5.60022 10.60000 
Continuous vs. Disruptive 1.86767 1.66416 1.12229 0.26445 -1.43438 5.16972 -1.43438 5.16972 





APPENDIX B.   REGRESSION OUTPUT FOR WORTHINESS METRICS & INDICES (CONTINUED) 
 
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.51924        
R Square 0.26961        
Adjusted R Square 0.24747        
Standard Error 23.74034        
Observations 103        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 3 20595.96 6865.32 12.18 0.00    
Residual 99 55796.75 563.60      
Total 102 76392.72          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Adoption Index #5 -43.45820 11.94054 -3.63955 0.00044 -67.15081 -19.76558 -67.15081 -19.76558 
Tech. Maturity 8.93619 1.60632 5.56316 0.00000 5.74891 12.12347 5.74891 12.12347 
Continuous vs. Disruptive 0.68095 2.12175 0.32094 0.74893 -3.52906 4.89096 -3.52906 4.89096 
Revolutionary Capability 2.21581 2.42857 0.91239 0.36378 -2.60300 7.03461 -2.60300 7.03461 
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APPENDIX B.   REGRESSION OUTPUT FOR WORTHINESS METRICS & INDICES (CONTINUED) 
 
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.56607        
R Square 0.32044        
Adjusted R Square 0.29984        
Standard Error 18.02616        
Observations 103        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 3 15168.79 5056.26 15.56 0.00    
Residual 99 32169.31 324.94      
Total 102 47338.10          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Adoption Index #7 -29.27908 9.06651 -3.22937 0.00168 -47.26901 -11.28916 -47.26901 -11.28916 
Tech. Maturity 7.56858 1.21968 6.20536 0.00000 5.14847 9.98870 5.14847 9.98870 
Continuous vs. Disruptive 2.90847 1.61106 1.80532 0.07406 -0.28821 6.10516 -0.28821 6.10516 




APPENDIX C.  REGRESSION OUTPUT FOR DOD MARKET FACTORS & INDICES 
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.57453        
R Square 0.33008        
Adjusted R Square 0.31668        
Standard Error 19.42349        
Observations 103        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 18588.72 9294.36 24.64 0.00    
Residual 100 37727.20 377.27      
Total 102 56315.92          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Adoption Index #1 -9.84864 4.52163 -2.17812 0.03175 -18.81942 -0.87786 -18.81942 -0.87786 
Immediate W/F Need -0.76856 1.69805 -0.45261 0.65181 -4.13745 2.60033 -4.13745 2.60033 
Mission Fit 9.06554 1.84781 4.90610 0.00000 5.39954 12.73155 5.39954 12.73155 
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APPENDIX C.   REGRESSION OUTPUT FOR DOD MARKET FACTORS & INDICES (CONTINUED) 
 
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.55604        
R Square 0.30918        
Adjusted R Square 0.29536        
Standard Error 18.76323        
Observations 103        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 15756.37 7878.19 22.38 0.00    
Residual 100 35205.88 352.06      
Total 102 50962.26          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Adoption Index #2 -3.78844 4.36792 -0.86733 0.38784 -12.45428 4.87739 -12.45428 4.87739 
Immediate W/F Need -2.57549 1.64033 -1.57010 0.11955 -5.82986 0.67888 -5.82986 0.67888 
Mission Fit 9.68757 1.78500 5.42722 0.00000 6.14619 13.22896 6.14619 13.22896 
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APPENDIX C.   REGRESSION OUTPUT FOR DOD MARKET FACTORS & INDICES (CONTINUED) 
 
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.54185        
R Square 0.29360        
Adjusted R Square 0.27947        
Standard Error 23.23007        
Observations 103        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 22429.11 11214.55 20.78 0.00    
Residual 100 53963.61 539.64      
Total 102 76392.72          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Adoption Index #5 -13.01213 5.40777 -2.40619 0.01796 -23.74099 -2.28328 -23.74099 -2.28328 
Immediate W/F Need -1.50960 2.03083 -0.74334 0.45902 -5.53872 2.51952 -5.53872 2.51952 
Mission Fit 10.46487 2.20994 4.73536 0.00001 6.08041 14.84932 6.08041 14.84932 
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APPENDIX C.   REGRESSION OUTPUT FOR DOD MARKET FACTORS & INDICES (CONTINUED) 
 
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.51369        
R Square 0.26388        
Adjusted R Square 0.24915        
Standard Error 18.66726        
Observations 103        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 12491.44 6245.72 17.92 0.00    
Residual 100 34846.66 348.47      
Total 102 47338.10          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Adoption Index #7 2.69140 4.34558 0.61934 0.53710 -5.93011 11.31292 -5.93011 11.31292 
Immediate W/F Need -3.61686 1.63194 -2.21629 0.02894 -6.85458 -0.37913 -6.85458 -0.37913 




APPENDIX D.  REGRESSION OUTPUT FOR COMBINED METRICS & INDICES 
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.67484        
R Square 0.45541        
Adjusted R Square 0.42734        
Standard Error 17.78138        
Observations 103        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 5 25646.70 5129.34 16.22 0.00    
Residual 97 30669.22 316.18      
Total 102 56315.92          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Adoption Index #1 -38.52435 9.02652 -4.26791 0.00005 -56.43949 -20.60921 -56.43949 -20.60921 
Tech. Maturity 6.02120 1.34100 4.49008 0.00002 3.35969 8.68272 3.35969 8.68272 
Continuous vs. Disruptive 1.91268 1.60616 1.19084 0.23662 -1.27511 5.10047 -1.27511 5.10047 
Revolutionary Capability -0.57231 1.93296 -0.29608 0.76780 -4.40871 3.26409 -4.40871 3.26409 
Immediate W/F Need -0.34699 1.56405 -0.22186 0.82489 -3.45120 2.75721 -3.45120 2.75721 
Mission Fit 6.04881 1.84111 3.28541 0.00142 2.39472 9.70291 2.39472 9.70291 
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APPENDIX D.   REGRESSION OUTPUT FOR COMBINED METRICS & INDICES (CONTINUED) 
 
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.66127        
R Square 0.43727        
Adjusted R Square 0.40827        
Standard Error 17.19440        
Observations 103        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 5 22284.45 4456.89 15.08 0.00    
Residual 97 28677.81 295.65      
Total 102 50962.26          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Adoption Index #2 -29.01337 8.72855 -3.32396 0.00125 -46.33712 -11.68962 -46.33712 -11.68962 
Tech. Maturity 5.66252 1.29673 4.36676 0.00003 3.08887 8.23618 3.08887 8.23618 
Continuous vs. Disruptive 2.43968 1.55314 1.57080 0.11949 -0.64288 5.52224 -0.64288 5.52224 
Revolutionary Capability -1.68039 1.86916 -0.89901 0.37087 -5.39015 2.02936 -5.39015 2.02936 
Immediate W/F Need -2.08746 1.51242 -1.38021 0.17069 -5.08920 0.91427 -5.08920 0.91427 
Mission Fit 7.01458 1.78033 3.94004 0.00015 3.48111 10.54805 3.48111 10.54805 
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APPENDIX D.   REGRESSION OUTPUT FOR COMBINED METRICS & INDICES (CONTINUED) 
 
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.61560        
R Square 0.37896        
Adjusted R Square 0.34695        
Standard Error 22.11559        
Observations 103        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 5 28950.08 5790.02 11.84 0.00    
Residual 97 47442.64 489.10      
Total 102 76392.72          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Adoption Index #5 -38.53968 11.22673 -3.43285 0.00088 -60.82164 -16.25773 -60.82164 -16.25773 
Tech. Maturity 5.89478 1.66787 3.53431 0.00063 2.58452 9.20504 2.58452 9.20504 
Continuous vs. Disruptive 1.54391 1.99767 0.77286 0.44149 -2.42090 5.50873 -2.42090 5.50873 
Revolutionary Capability -0.84758 2.40412 -0.35255 0.72519 -5.61910 3.92395 -5.61910 3.92395 
Immediate W/F Need -1.09417 1.94529 -0.56247 0.57509 -4.95503 2.76668 -4.95503 2.76668 
Mission Fit 7.63401 2.28988 3.33380 0.00121 3.08923 12.17879 3.08923 12.17879 
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APPENDIX D.   REGRESSION OUTPUT FOR COMBINED METRICS & INDICES (CONTINUED) 
 
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.64242        
R Square 0.41270        
Adjusted R Square 0.38243        
Standard Error 16.92966        
Observations 103        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 5 19536.59 3907.32 13.63 0.00    
Residual 97 27801.51 286.61      
Total 102 47338.10          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Adoption Index #7 -24.87572 8.59415 -2.89449 0.00469 -41.93274 -7.81870 -41.93274 -7.81870 
Tech. Maturity 5.60366 1.27677 4.38894 0.00003 3.06963 8.13769 3.06963 8.13769 
Continuous vs. Disruptive 3.23079 1.52923 2.11269 0.03719 0.19569 6.26589 0.19569 6.26589 
Revolutionary Capability -1.89363 1.84038 -1.02894 0.30607 -5.54627 1.75901 -5.54627 1.75901 
Immediate W/F Need -3.08690 1.48913 -2.07295 0.04083 -6.04242 -0.13138 -6.04242 -0.13138 




APPENDIX E.  DARPA TECHNOLOGY DATABASE 
























Scale   
Yes = 1       
No = 0   
Yes = 1      
No = 0 
Yes = 1     
No = 0 
Yes = 1      
No = 0 
Yes = 1       
No = 0 
Yes = 1        
No = 0 
ID 
No. Program TW TORG TPOR TST TOD TOTH TZ 
1 Wasp Micro Air Vehicle 1 
USAF, USMC, 
OGA 1 1 1 1 0 
2 Ultra-Wideband Multifunction Photonic Transmit/Receive Module (ULTRA-T/R) 0 (PT) NIOC 0 0 1 0 0 
3 DARPA Agent Markup Language (DAML) 0   0 1 1 1 0 
4 Air-Collection and Enrichment System (ACES) 0   0 0 0 0 1 
5 Wide Area All Terrain Change Indication and Tomography (WATCH-IT) 0 NGA 1 1 0 0 0 
6 Micro Adaptive Flow Control (MAFC) 0   1 1 0 0 0 
7 Radiological Decontamination Program 0 DHS, HSARPA 0 1 0 1 0 
8 Optimum Design of Tailored Topological Armors for Blast and Ballistic Threat Defeat 0 ARL 1 1 0 0 0 
9 Joint Air Ground Operations: Unified, Adaptive Re-Planning (JAGUAR) 0 USAF 0 1 0 0 0 
10 Combat Zones That See (CZTS) 0   0 0 0 0 0 
11 Advanced Tactical Targeting Technology (AT3) 0 USAF 1 1 0 1 0 
12 Airborne-Gunshot Detection and Localization System 0   0 0 0 0 1 
13 Dynamic Optical Tags (DOTS) 1 Classified 0 0 0 0 0 
14 Vaporization Cooled Turbine Demonstration 0   0 1 0 0 0 
15 Acoustic Array for Torpedo Defense (Electric Curtain) 0   0 0 0 0 1 
16 XMONARCH (eXtended MOrphable Networked microARCHitecture)  0   0 1 0 1 0 
17 A160 Engine Development Program 0 Contractor 0 0 0 1 0 
18 X-ray Sourced-Based Navigation for Autonomous Position Determination (XNAV) 0   0 0 0 0 1 
19 Adaptive Cognition-Enhanced Radio Teams (ACERT) 0   0 0 0 0 1 
20 Advanced Precision Optical Oscillators (aPROPOS) 0   0 1 1 1 0 
21 Architectures for Cognitive Information Processing (ACIP) 0   0 0 0 0 1 
22 Active Templates 1 USSOCOM 1 1 0 1 0 
23 Aluminum Combuster Power System 0   0 0 0 0 1 
24 Analog Optical Signal Processing (AOSP) 0 Contractor 0 0 0 1 0 
25 Adaptable Reliable Middleware Systems (ARMS) 0 Contractor 0 0 0 1 0 
26 All Weather Sniper Scope (AWSS) 0 MTO 0 1 0 0 0 
27 Buoyancy Assisted Lift Air Vehicle (BAAV) 0   1 1 0 0 0 
28 Biologically Inspired Cognitive Architecture (BICA) 0   0 0 0 0 0 
29 Boomerang 1 US Army 0 0 0 0 0 
30 Biodynotics 0 USMC 0 1 1 0 0 
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APPENDIX E.   DARPA TECHNOLOGY DATABASE (CONTINUED) 























e     
Yes = 1            
No = 0 
Yes = 1         
No = 0   
Yes = 1        
No = 0 
Yes = 1       
No = 0 
Lab = 1        
Field = 2       
Other = 3 
ID 
No. Program TS TC TM  PWC  DUOM TBR TE 
1 Wasp Micro Air Vehicle 60 1 0 3,274 1 0 2 
2 Ultra-Wideband Multifunction Photonic Transmit/Receive Module (ULTRA-T/R) UKN 0 1 2,629 1 1 1 
3 DARPA Agent Markup Language (DAML) UKN 0 1 1,376 0 1 1 
4 Air-Collection and Enrichment System (ACES) N/A 0 0 2,449 0 0 1 
5 Wide Area All Terrain Change Indication and Tomography (WATCH-IT) UKN 1 0 3,694 1 0 3 
6 Micro Adaptive Flow Control (MAFC) UKN 1 0 2,387 0 0 3 
7 Radiological Decontamination Program UKN 1 0 1,187 0 0 1 
8 Optimum Design of Tailored Topological Armors for Blast and Ballistic Threat Defeat 14 1 0 1,579 1 0 1 
9 Joint Air Ground Operations: Unified, Adaptive Re-Planning (JAGUAR) 66 1 0 1,736 1 0 3 
10 Combat Zones That See (CZTS) N/A 0 0 962 0 0 2 
11 Advanced Tactical Targeting Technology (AT3) 92 1 0 1,219 1 0 3 
12 Airborne-Gunshot Detection and Localization System N/A 0 0 750 0 0 1 
13 Dynamic Optical Tags (DOTS) UKN 1 0 1,300 1 0 3 
14 Vaporization Cooled Turbine Demonstration 27 0 1 1,436 0 0 1 
15 Acoustic Array for Torpedo Defense (Electric Curtain) N/A 0 0 3,682 0 1 3 
16 XMONARCH (eXtended MOrphable Networked microARCHitecture)  42 1 0 2,369 0 0 1 
17 A160 Engine Development Program UKN 1 0 2,527 0 0 1 
18 X-ray Sourced-Based Navigation for Autonomous Position Determination (XNAV) N/A 0 0 1,406 0 0 1 
19 Adaptive Cognition-Enhanced Radio Teams (ACERT) N/A 0 0 720 0 0 1 
20 Advanced Precision Optical Oscillators (aPROPOS) UKN 1 0 5,097 0 1 1 
21 Architectures for Cognitive Information Processing (ACIP) N/A 0 0 1,565 0 0 1 
22 Active Templates UKN 1 1 4,470 1 0 3 
23 Aluminum Combuster Power System N/A 0 0 2,174 0 0 1 
24 Analog Optical Signal Processing (AOSP) UKN 0 1 1,081 0 0 1 
25 Adaptable Reliable Middleware Systems (ARMS) UKN 0 1 796 0 0 1 
26 All Weather Sniper Scope (AWSS) 17 1 0 1,235 1 0 1 
27 Buoyancy Assisted Lift Air Vehicle (BAAV) UKN 0 1 663 0 0 1 
28 Biologically Inspired Cognitive Architecture (BICA) N/A 0 0 4,879 0 0 1 
29 Boomerang UKN 1 0 815 1 0 3 




APPENDIX E.   DARPA TECHNOLOGY DATABASE (CONTINUED) 
















Scale   
1 to 7             
no imprv. = 1      
vastly imprv. = 
7 
1 to 7             
no imprv. = 1      
vastly imprv. = 
7 
1 to 7            
not at all = 1      
significantly = 
7 
1 to 7             
not at all = 1       
significantly = 7 




No. Program PIWS PIWJS PIWN PFWN PTM 
1 Wasp Micro Air Vehicle 5 6 7 3 9 
2 Ultra-Wideband Multifunction Photonic Transmit/Receive Module (ULTRA-T/R) 1 5 4 5 3 
3 DARPA Agent Markup Language (DAML) 1 4 3 3 3 
4 Air-Collection and Enrichment System (ACES) 1 1 2 4 4 
5 Wide Area All Terrain Change Indication and Tomography (WATCH-IT) 4 5 5 5 6 
6 Micro Adaptive Flow Control (MAFC) 1 2 3 5 5 
7 Radiological Decontamination Program 5 3 2 3 6 
8 Optimum Design of Tailored Topological Armors for Blast and Ballistic Threat Defeat 7 5 6 5 3 
9 Joint Air Ground Operations: Unified, Adaptive Re-Planning (JAGUAR) 1 5 3 4 7 
10 Combat Zones That See (CZTS) 6 6 3 4 4 
11 Advanced Tactical Targeting Technology (AT3) 6 3 4 4 6 
12 Airborne-Gunshot Detection and Localization System 6 5 5 4 2 
13 Dynamic Optical Tags (DOTS) 6 6 6 2 8 
14 Vaporization Cooled Turbine Demonstration 1 1 2 3 3 
15 Acoustic Array for Torpedo Defense (Electric Curtain) 6 2 2 4 3 
16 XMONARCH (eXtended MOrphable Networked microARCHitecture)  1 5 4 5 5 
17 A160 Engine Development Program 1 1 3 3 6 
18 X-ray Sourced-Based Navigation for Autonomous Position Determination (XNAV) 1 1 1 5 2 
19 Adaptive Cognition-Enhanced Radio Teams (ACERT) 1 6 2 4 3 
20 Advanced Precision Optical Oscillators (aPROPOS) 4 4 5 6 TBR 
21 Architectures for Cognitive Information Processing (ACIP) 1 6 3 5 3 
22 Active Templates 3 6 5 3 6 
23 Aluminum Combuster Power System 1 1 3 4 4 
24 Analog Optical Signal Processing (AOSP) 1 4 4 5 4 
25 Adaptable Reliable Middleware Systems (ARMS) 1 1 2 4 3 
26 All Weather Sniper Scope (AWSS) 1 5 4 4 5 
27 Buoyancy Assisted Lift Air Vehicle (BAAV) 1 1 1 1 3 
28 Biologically Inspired Cognitive Architecture (BICA) 1 5 1 1 1 
29 Boomerang 7 7 7 3 8 
30 Biodynotics 1 6 5 4 6 
 88
APPENDIX E.   DARPA TECHNOLOGY DATABASE (CONTINUED) 












Prepares DoD for 
the future 
Scale   
1 to 7             
not useful = 1      
very useful = 7 
1 to 7           
continuous = 1 
disruptive = 7 
1 to 7            
not rev. = 1       
exceptionally 
rev. = 7 
1 to 7                   
no enhance. = 1          
complete enhance. = 7 
1 to 7               
not at all = 1         
exceptionally so = 
7 
ID 
No. Program PEU PCD PREV PLTP PDF 
1 Wasp Micro Air Vehicle 7 7 7 1 7 
2 Ultra-Wideband Multifunction Photonic Transmit/Receive Module (ULTRA-T/R) TBR TBR TBR TBR TBR 
3 DARPA Agent Markup Language (DAML) TBR TBR TBR TBR TBR 
4 Air-Collection and Enrichment System (ACES) 5 6 6 1 6 
5 Wide Area All Terrain Change Indication and Tomography (WATCH-IT) 5 3 3 5 5 
6 Micro Adaptive Flow Control (MAFC) 5 5 6 5 6 
7 Radiological Decontamination Program 6 7 6 1 6 
8 Optimum Design of Tailored Topological Armors for Blast and Ballistic Threat Defeat 7 2 4 5 5 
9 Joint Air Ground Operations: Unified, Adaptive Re-Planning (JAGUAR) 5 6 6 1 6 
10 Combat Zones That See (CZTS) 5 6 6 2 5 
11 Advanced Tactical Targeting Technology (AT3) 5 7 6 5 5 
12 Airborne-Gunshot Detection and Localization System 5 3 4 3 4 
13 Dynamic Optical Tags (DOTS) 7 7 7 1 5 
14 Vaporization Cooled Turbine Demonstration 3 3 4 5 5 
15 Acoustic Array for Torpedo Defense (Electric Curtain) 2 5 6 1 5 
16 XMONARCH (eXtended MOrphable Networked microARCHitecture)  5 5 6 5 6 
17 A160 Engine Development Program 4 4 4 6 5 
18 X-ray Sourced-Based Navigation for Autonomous Position Determination (XNAV) 4 5 7 3 5 
19 Adaptive Cognition-Enhanced Radio Teams (ACERT) 5 6 5 1 6 
20 Advanced Precision Optical Oscillators (aPROPOS) TBR TBR TBR TBR TBR 
21 Architectures for Cognitive Information Processing (ACIP) 6 4 3 5 4 
22 Active Templates 6 5 5 2 5 
23 Aluminum Combuster Power System 5 6 5 3 5 
24 Analog Optical Signal Processing (AOSP) 4 5 6 5 5 
25 Adaptable Reliable Middleware Systems (ARMS) 4 4 4 3 4 
26 All Weather Sniper Scope (AWSS) 5 3 2 6 3 
27 Buoyancy Assisted Lift Air Vehicle (BAAV) 5 4 2 1 4 
28 Biologically Inspired Cognitive Architecture (BICA) 6 7 6 5 5 
29 Boomerang 7 6 7 1 5 




APPENDIX E.   DARPA TECHNOLOGY DATABASE (CONTINUED) 














Scale   
1 to 7           
no fit = 1        
great fit = 7 
1 to 7            
not flexible = 1    
very flexible = 
7 
1 to 7                
not adaptable = 1     
very adaptable = 7 
1 to 7                  
not interoperable = 1    
very interoperable = 
7 
1 to 7                  
no savings = 1          
significant savings = 7 
ID 
No. Program PMF PFMU PAUN PINT PSAV 
1 Wasp Micro Air Vehicle 7 6 6 N/A 6 
2 Ultra-Wideband Multifunction Photonic Transmit/Receive Module (ULTRA-T/R) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
3 DARPA Agent Markup Language (DAML) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
4 Air-Collection and Enrichment System (ACES) N/A N/A N/A N/A 5 
5 Wide Area All Terrain Change Indication and Tomography (WATCH-IT) 5 3 4 5 1 
6 Micro Adaptive Flow Control (MAFC) N/A N/A N/A 3 1 
7 Radiological Decontamination Program 3 N/A N/A N/A 7 
8 Optimum Design of Tailored Topological Armors for Blast and Ballistic Threat Defeat 7 N/A N/A N/A 7 
9 Joint Air Ground Operations: Unified, Adaptive Re-Planning (JAGUAR) 2 N/A 5 5 4 
10 Combat Zones That See (CZTS) 2 N/A N/A N/A 5 
11 Advanced Tactical Targeting Technology (AT3) 4 1 1 5 5 
12 Airborne-Gunshot Detection and Localization System 1 N/A N/A N/A 5 
13 Dynamic Optical Tags (DOTS) 6 6 6 N/A 3 
14 Vaporization Cooled Turbine Demonstration 2 N/A N/A N/A 3 
15 Acoustic Array for Torpedo Defense (Electric Curtain) 2 N/A N/A N/A 2 
16 XMONARCH (eXtended MOrphable Networked microARCHitecture)  5 6 6 5 6 
17 A160 Engine Development Program 2 N/A N/A 5 5 
18 X-ray Sourced-Based Navigation for Autonomous Position Determination (XNAV) 2 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
19 Adaptive Cognition-Enhanced Radio Teams (ACERT) 1 N/A N/A N/A 1 
20 Advanced Precision Optical Oscillators (aPROPOS) TBR TBR TBR TBR TBR 
21 Architectures for Cognitive Information Processing (ACIP) 1 4 5 N/A 5 
22 Active Templates 5 4 5 5 5 
23 Aluminum Combuster Power System 3 N/A N/A 5 5 
24 Analog Optical Signal Processing (AOSP) 3 5 N/A N/A 5 
25 Adaptable Reliable Middleware Systems (ARMS) 2 N/A N/A N/A 2 
26 All Weather Sniper Scope (AWSS) 2 1 1 3 1 
27 Buoyancy Assisted Lift Air Vehicle (BAAV) 1 5 5 N/A 1 
28 Biologically Inspired Cognitive Architecture (BICA) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
29 Boomerang 7 5 6 N/A 3 
30 Biodynotics 4 6 6 N/A 2 
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Scale   
Yes = 1       
No = 0   
Yes = 1      
No = 0 
Yes = 1     
No = 0 
Yes = 1      
No = 0 
Yes = 1       
No = 0 
Yes = 1        
No = 0 
ID 
No. Program TW TORG TPOR TST TOD TOTH TZ 
31 Bio-Optic Synthetic Systems (BOSS) 0   0 0 0 1 0 
32 Cross Border Tunnel (CBT) 0   0 0 0 0 1 
33 Coherent Communications, Imaging, and Targeting (CCIT) 0   0 0 0 1 0 
34 Clockless, Logical, Analysis, Synthesis, and Systems (CLASS) 0   0 0 0 1 0 
35 Compact Military Engine (CME) 0   0 0 0 0 1 
36 Connectionless Networks (CN) 0   0 0 1 0 0 
37 Chip Scale Wavelength Division Multiplexing (CS-WDM) 0   0 1 0 1 0 
38 DARPA Automated Competence Assessment and Alarms for Teams (DARCAAT) 0 US Army 0 1 0 0 0 
40 Defense Against Cyber Attacks on Mobile Ad-Hoc Network Systems (DCAMANETS) 0 US Army 0 1 0 0 0 
41 Deep View 0   1 1 0 0 0 
42 DARPA Network Archive (DNA) 0   0 0 0 0 1 
43 Direct Thermal to Electric Conversion (DTEC) 0   1 1 1 0 0 
44 Dynamic Tactical Targeting (DTT): Tactical Exercises and System Testing (TEST) 0 USAF 0 1 1 0 0 
45 Exploitation of 3D Data (E3D) 0   0 0 0 0 1 
46 Electromagnetic Mortar (EMM) 0 ONR 0 1 0 0 0 
47 Energy Starved Electronics (ESE) 0   0 1 0 0 0 
48 Exoskeleton (Exo) 0 NSRDEC 0 1 0 0 0 
49 Explosive Handling Detection 0   0 0 0 0 1 
50 Fast Connectivity for Coalitions and Agents Project (Fast C2AP) 1 USN, NATO 0 1 0 1 0 
51 Femtosecond Adaptive Spectroscopy Techniques for Remote Agent Detection (FASTREAD) 0 DOE, DHS 0 1 0 0 0 
52 Future Combat Systems Communications/Network Centric Radio System 0 USSOCOM 1 0 0 0 0 
53 Friction Drag Reduction  0   0 1 0 0 0 
54 High-Frequency Active Auroral Project (HAARP) Instrument Completion 0 AFRL, ONR 1 1 1 0 0 
55 Handheld Isothermal Silver Standard Sensor 0 DTRA 0 1 0 0 0 
56 High Performance Corrosion Resistant Materials (HPCRM) 0 NAAC 0 1 1 1 0 
57 High Power Fiber Lasers (HPFL) 0   0 0 0 1 0 
58 High Precision Long-Range Laser Designator (HPLD) 0   0 0 1 0 0 
59 Hypersonic Collaborative Australia/United States Experiment (HyCAUSE) 0   0 1 1 0 0 
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Scale     
Yes = 1       
No = 0 
Yes = 1       
No = 0   
Yes = 1        
No = 0 
Yes = 1       
No = 0 
Lab = 1        
Field = 2       
Other = 3 
ID 
No. Program TS TC TM 
 
PWC  DUOM TBR TE 
31 Bio-Optic Synthetic Systems (BOSS) 71 0 1 1,082 0 1 3 
32 Cross Border Tunnel (CBT) N/A 0 0 1,442 0 0 1 
33 Coherent Communications, Imaging, and Targeting (CCIT) UKN 0 1 1,563 0 1 1 
34 Clockless, Logical, Analysis, Synthesis, and Systems (CLASS) 72 0 1 1,971 0 0 1 
35 Compact Military Engine (CME) N/A 0 0 2,757 0 0 1 
36 Connectionless Networks (CN) 66 1 0 1,279 0 0 1 
37 Chip Scale Wavelength Division Multiplexing (CS-WDM) UKN 1 0 2,933 0 0 3 
38 DARPA Automated Competence Assessment and Alarms for Teams (DARCAAT) 16.5 1 0 833 0 0 3 
40 Defense Against Cyber Attacks on Mobile Ad-Hoc Network Systems (DCAMANETS) UKN 1 0 1,005 0 0 1 
41 Deep View N/A 0 1 1,830 0 0 1 
42 DARPA Network Archive (DNA) N/A 0 0 2,313 0 0 1 
43 Direct Thermal to Electric Conversion (DTEC) 53 1 0 963 1 0 1 
44 Dynamic Tactical Targeting (DTT): Tactical Exercises and System Testing (TEST) 26 1 0 1,839 0 0 3 
45 Exploitation of 3D Data (E3D) N/A 0 0 2,253 0 0 1 
46 Electromagnetic Mortar (EMM) 45 0 1 932 0 0 1 
47 Energy Starved Electronics (ESE) 19 1 0 2,393 0 1 1 
48 Exoskeleton (Exo) 36 1 0 1,275 1 0 3 
49 Explosive Handling Detection N/A 0 0 1,045 0 0 2 
50 Fast Connectivity for Coalitions and Agents Project (Fast C2AP) UKN 1 0 1,827 1 0 3 
51 Femtosecond Adaptive Spectroscopy Techniques for Remote Agent Detection (FASTREAD) N/A 0 1 633 1 0 1 
52 Future Combat Systems Communications/Network Centric Radio System 58 1 0 2,962 0 0 3 
53 Friction Drag Reduction  UKN 0 1 2,320 0 1 1 
54 High-Frequency Active Auroral Project (HAARP) Instrument Completion 45 1 0 1,639 0 0 3 
55 Handheld Isothermal Silver Standard Sensor N/A 0 1 1,866 0 0 1 
56 High Performance Corrosion Resistant Materials (HPCRM) 34 1 0 1,124 0 0 1 
57 High Power Fiber Lasers (HPFL) UKN 1 0 2,117 0 0 1 
58 High Precision Long-Range Laser Designator (HPLD) 18 0 1 883 0 0 2 
59 Hypersonic Collaborative Australia/United States Experiment (HyCAUSE) UKN 0 1 1,605 0 0 3 
60 Intelligent RF Front Ends (IRFFE) UKN 1 0 1,503 1 0 1 
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e   
1 to 7              
no imprv. = 1       
vastly imprv. = 7 
1 to 7            
no imprv. = 1      
vastly imprv. = 
7 
1 to 7            
not at all = 1      
significantly = 7 
1 to 7            
not at all = 1      
significantly = 7 




No. Program PIWS PIWJS PIWN PFWN PTM 
31 Bio-Optic Synthetic Systems (BOSS) 1 4 2 4 5 
32 Cross Border Tunnel (CBT) 6 2 5 4 4 
33 Coherent Communications, Imaging, and Targeting (CCIT) 1 5 3 4 TBR 
34 Clockless, Logical, Analysis, Synthesis, and Systems (CLASS) 1 5 2 6 4 
35 Compact Military Engine (CME) 1 5 4 4 5 
36 Connectionless Networks (CN) 1 3 2 3 5 
37 Chip Scale Wavelength Division Multiplexing (CS-WDM) 1 1 2 5 5 
38 DARPA Automated Competence Assessment and Alarms for Teams (DARCAAT) 5 3 2 4 6 
40 Defense Against Cyber Attacks on Mobile Ad-Hoc Network Systems (DCAMANETS) 5 5 7 7 5 
41 Deep View 1 1 2 5 5 
42 DARPA Network Archive (DNA) 1 2 2 2 6 
43 Direct Thermal to Electric Conversion (DTEC) 1 1 4 6 5 
44 Dynamic Tactical Targeting (DTT): Tactical Exercises and System Testing (TEST) 3 6 5 3 6 
45 Exploitation of 3D Data (E3D) 5 5 5 3 6 
46 Electromagnetic Mortar (EMM) 3 6 3 5 6 
47 Energy Starved Electronics (ESE) 1 3 6 5 5 
48 Exoskeleton (Exo) 3 6 4 2 6 
49 Explosive Handling Detection 5 1 5 5 6 
50 Fast Connectivity for Coalitions and Agents Project (Fast C2AP) 2 6 5 3 8 
51 Femtosecond Adaptive Spectroscopy Techniques for Remote Agent Detection (FASTREAD) 4 3 2 5 3 
52 Future Combat Systems Communications/Network Centric Radio System 3 6 6 2 7 
53 Friction Drag Reduction  1 1 2 5 3 
54 High-Frequency Active Auroral Project (HAARP) Instrument Completion 1 3 2 5 8 
55 Handheld Isothermal Silver Standard Sensor 5 2 2 5 5 
56 High Performance Corrosion Resistant Materials (HPCRM) 1 2 2 5 6 
57 High Power Fiber Lasers (HPFL) 5 1 6 2 4 
58 High Precision Long-Range Laser Designator (HPLD) 2 6 5 2 5 
59 Hypersonic Collaborative Australia/United States Experiment (HyCAUSE) 1 1 4 4 6 
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Prepares DoD for 
the future 
Scale   
1 to 7            
not useful = 1      
very useful = 7 
1 to 7        
continuous = 1 
disruptive = 7 
1 to 7                 
not rev. = 1            
exceptionally rev. = 
7 
1 to 7                  
no enhance. = 1         
complete enhance. = 7 
1 to 7                
not at all = 1          
exceptionally so = 7 
ID 
No. Program PEU PCD PREV PLTP PDF 
31 Bio-Optic Synthetic Systems (BOSS) 4 5 6 4 5 
32 Cross Border Tunnel (CBT) N/A 6 6 1 5 
33 Coherent Communications, Imaging, and Targeting (CCIT) TBR TBR TBR TBR TBR 
34 Clockless, Logical, Analysis, Synthesis, and Systems (CLASS) 6 6 6 6 6 
35 Compact Military Engine (CME) 6 3 4 1 3 
36 Connectionless Networks (CN) 5 5 5 2 4 
37 Chip Scale Wavelength Division Multiplexing (CS-WDM) 6 3 3 5 5 
38 DARPA Automated Competence Assessment and Alarms for Teams (DARCAAT) 4 6 5 1 5 
40 Defense Against Cyber Attacks on Mobile Ad-Hoc Network Systems (DCAMANETS) 6 6 6 6 6 
41 Deep View 4 2 2 5 5 
42 DARPA Network Archive (DNA) 5 3 2 1 5 
43 Direct Thermal to Electric Conversion (DTEC) 5 6 6 3 5 
44 Dynamic Tactical Targeting (DTT): Tactical Exercises and System Testing (TEST) 6 6 6 6 6 
45 Exploitation of 3D Data (E3D) 5 3 4 5 5 
46 Electromagnetic Mortar (EMM) 6 6 7 1 6 
47 Energy Starved Electronics (ESE) 6 5 6 3 5 
48 Exoskeleton (Exo) 6 6 5 1 4 
49 Explosive Handling Detection 6 3 5 1 2 
50 Fast Connectivity for Coalitions and Agents Project (Fast C2AP) 7 5 7 5 5 
51 Femtosecond Adaptive Spectroscopy Techniques for Remote Agent Detection (FASTREAD) 5 5 5 1 5 
52 Future Combat Systems Communications/Network Centric Radio System 6 6 5 3 4 
53 Friction Drag Reduction  5 6 4 5 3 
54 High-Frequency Active Auroral Project (HAARP) Instrument Completion 5 5 5 1 6 
55 Handheld Isothermal Silver Standard Sensor 4 5 4 1 3 
56 High Performance Corrosion Resistant Materials (HPCRM) 5 3 3 6 4 
57 High Power Fiber Lasers (HPFL) 6 7 6 2 6 
58 High Precision Long-Range Laser Designator (HPLD) 5 3 5 2 4 
59 Hypersonic Collaborative Australia/United States Experiment (HyCAUSE) 6 6 5 1 5 
60 Intelligent RF Front Ends (IRFFE) 4 5 4 5 4 
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APPENDIX E.   DARPA TECHNOLOGY DATABASE (CONTINUED) 
    TECHNOLOGIES 31-60 (CONTINUED) 
Mission fit 
(right tech, 
place, & time) 
Flexibility in 
mission use 







Scale   
1 to 7           
no fit = 1        
great fit = 7 
1 to 7            
not flexible = 1    
very flexible = 
7 
1 to 7               
not adaptable = 1     
very adaptable = 7 
1 to 7                  
not interoperable = 1     
very interoperable = 7 
1 to 7                 
no savings = 1          
significant savings = 
7 
ID 
No. Program PMF PFMU PAUN PINT PSAV 
31 Bio-Optic Synthetic Systems (BOSS) 3 4 N/A N/A 3 
32 Cross Border Tunnel (CBT) 5 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
33 Coherent Communications, Imaging, and Targeting (CCIT) N/A TBR TBR TBR TBR 
34 Clockless, Logical, Analysis, Synthesis, and Systems (CLASS) 3 6 5 6 5 
35 Compact Military Engine (CME) 3 6 6 N/A 5 
36 Connectionless Networks (CN) 3 2 N/A 5 2 
37 Chip Scale Wavelength Division Multiplexing (CS-WDM) 5 2 N/A 5 5 
38 DARPA Automated Competence Assessment and Alarms for Teams (DARCAAT) 2 1 N/A 4 1 
40 Defense Against Cyber Attacks on Mobile Ad-Hoc Network Systems (DCAMANETS) 6 2 6 6 2 
41 Deep View 2 1 2 4 2 
42 DARPA Network Archive (DNA) 2 5 5 5 6 
43 Direct Thermal to Electric Conversion (DTEC) 3 2 4 5 6 
44 Dynamic Tactical Targeting (DTT): Tactical Exercises and System Testing (TEST) 5 7 7 6 4 
45 Exploitation of 3D Data (E3D) 3 5 4 4 2 
46 Electromagnetic Mortar (EMM) 4 2 2 1 6 
47 Energy Starved Electronics (ESE) 4 2 6 6 6 
48 Exoskeleton (Exo) 4 4 6 3 5 
49 Explosive Handling Detection 3 1 1 1 2 
50 Fast Connectivity for Coalitions and Agents Project (Fast C2AP) 6 2 6 4 7 
51 Femtosecond Adaptive Spectroscopy Techniques for Remote Agent Detection (FASTREAD) 2 1 N/A 2 3 
52 Future Combat Systems Communications/Network Centric Radio System 5 2 6 7 5 
53 Friction Drag Reduction  2 1 1 1 1 
54 High-Frequency Active Auroral Project (HAARP) Instrument Completion 3 3 4 4 1 
55 Handheld Isothermal Silver Standard Sensor 2 1 2 1 5 
56 High Performance Corrosion Resistant Materials (HPCRM) 3 2 6 N/A 6 
57 High Power Fiber Lasers (HPFL) 5 6 4 N/A 6 
58 High Precision Long-Range Laser Designator (HPLD) 2 5 5 1 5 
59 Hypersonic Collaborative Australia/United States Experiment (HyCAUSE) 2 1 2 N/A 5 




APPENDIX E.   DARPA TECHNOLOGY DATABASE (CONTINUED) 
    TECHNOLOGIES 61-90  
Technolog

























e   
Yes = 1       
No = 0   
Yes = 1      
No = 0 
Yes = 1     
No = 0 
Yes = 1      
No = 0 
Yes = 1       
No = 0 
Yes = 1        
No = 0 
ID 
No. Program TW TORG TPOR TST TOD TOTH TZ 
61 Innovative Space-Based Radar Antenna Technology (ISAT) 0   0 0 1 0 0 
62 Improving Warfighters Information Intake Under Stress (IWIIUS) 0 US Army, USN, USMC 1 0 0 1 0 
63 Passive Cellular Core Jet Blaster Deflector (JBD) 0 ONR 0 1 1 0 0 
64 Jigsaw 0 NVESD 0 1 0 1 0 
65 Learning Applied to Ground Robotics (LAGR) 0   0 0 1 0 0 
66 Language and Speech Exploitation Resources (LASER) POR 1 JFCOM, PEO IEW&S 0 0 1 0 0 
67 Low-Cost Cruise Missile Defense (LCCMD) 0 SMDC, AMRDEC 1 1 0 0 0 
68 Long View 0 AFRL 0 1 0 0 0 
69 Low Friction Engine Development Program 0   0 0 0 0 1 
70 Low Temperature Colossal Super-Saturation (LTCSS) 0   0 0 0 0 1 
71 Morphing Aircraft Structures (MAS) III 0   0 0 0 0 1 
72 Micro Air Vehicle Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (MAV ACTD) 1 US Army, USN 0 0 0 0 0 
73 Multicell and Dismounted Command and Control (M&DC2) 0 US Army, Joint, DRMO 1 0 0 0 0 
74 Meso-Scale Steam Engine Generator (MSEG) Program 0   0 1 0 0 0 
75 Model-Based Integration of Embedded Software (MoBIES) 0 USAF 1 0 0 0 0 
76 Project Mobius: A Study on the Feasibility of Learning by Reading 0   0 0 1 0 0 
77 Applications of Molecular Electronics (MoleApps) 0   0 0 0 1 0 
78 Mission Specific Processing (MSP) 0 Contractor 0 0 0 1 0 
79 Network Embedded Systems Technology (NEST) 0 Contractor 0 1 0 1 0 
80 National Tactical Exploitation Program (NTEX) 0 NGA 1 0 0 0 0 
81 Optical Code Division Multiple Access (O-CDMA) 0 Contractor 0 0 0 1 0 
82 Optically Designated Attack Munitions (ODAM) 0   0 0 0 0 1 
83 Orbital Express (OE) Space Operations Architecture 0   0 0 0 0 1 
84 Oblique Flying Wing (OFW) 0   0 0 0 1 0 
85 Optical and Radio Frequency (RF) Combined Link Experiment (ORCLE) 0   0 0 1 0 0 
86 Program Composition for Embedded Systems (PCES) 0 US Army, USN, USAF 1 1 0 1 0 
88 Radar Scope 1 
US Army, SOCOM, 
USMC 0 1 0 0 0 
89 Reversible Barriers Program (ReBar) 0   0 0 0 0 1 
90 Synthetic Aperture LADAR for Tactical Imaging (SALTI) 0   0 0 1 1 0 
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Scale     
Yes = 1       
No = 0 
Yes = 1        
No = 0   
Yes = 1        
No = 0 
Yes = 1       
No = 0 
Lab = 1        
Field = 2       
Other = 3 
ID 
No. Program TS TC TM  PWC  DUOM TBR TE 
61 Innovative Space-Based Radar Antenna Technology (ISAT) 54 0 1 1,956 0 0 1 
62 Improving Warfighters Information Intake Under Stress (IWIIUS) 61 1 0 1,033 1 0 3 
63 Passive Cellular Core Jet Blaster Deflector (JBD) UKN 0 1 2,535 0 0 1 
64 Jigsaw 81 1 0 1,504 0 0 3 
65 Learning Applied to Ground Robotics (LAGR) 44 1 0 1,415 0 0 1 
66 Language and Speech Exploitation Resources (LASER) POR 48 1 0 843 0 0 3 
67 Low-Cost Cruise Missile Defense (LCCMD) UKN 1 0 1,720 1 0 1 
68 Long View 23.5 1 0 4,009 0 0 1 
69 Low Friction Engine Development Program N/A 0 0 603 0 0 1 
70 Low Temperature Colossal Super-Saturation (LTCSS) N/A 0 0 2,536 0 0 1 
71 Morphing Aircraft Structures (MAS) III N/A 0 0 873 0 0 1 
72 Micro Air Vehicle Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (MAV ACTD) 57 1 0 1,622 1 0 3 
73 Multicell and Dismounted Command and Control (M&DC2) UKN 1 0 1,521 1 0 1 
74 Meso-Scale Steam Engine Generator (MSEG) Program 50 1 0 1,203 0 0 1 
75 Model-Based Integration of Embedded Software (MoBIES) 45 1 0 1,659 0 0 1 
76 Project Mobius: A Study on the Feasibility of Learning by Reading 26.5 1 0 1,698 0 0 1 
77 Applications of Molecular Electronics (MoleApps) 45 1 0 2,277 0 0 1 
78 Mission Specific Processing (MSP) UKN 1 0 2,110 0 0 3 
79 Network Embedded Systems Technology (NEST) 70.5 1 0 10,269 0 0 3 
80 National Tactical Exploitation Program (NTEX) 48 1 0 456 1 0 3 
81 Optical Code Division Multiple Access (O-CDMA) UKN 1 0 604 0 1 1 
82 Optically Designated Attack Munitions (ODAM) N/A 0 0 2,282 0 0 1 
83 Orbital Express (OE) Space Operations Architecture N/A 0 0 1,000 0 0 3 
84 Oblique Flying Wing (OFW) N/A 0 1 2,179 0 0 1 
85 Optical and Radio Frequency (RF) Combined Link Experiment (ORCLE) UKN 1 0 2,380 0 0 3 
86 Program Composition for Embedded Systems (PCES) UKN 1 0 3,411 0 0 3 
88 Radar Scope 19 1 0 1,370 0 0 3 
89 Reversible Barriers Program (ReBar) N/A 0 0 1,272 0 0 1 
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Scale   
1 to 7              
no imprv. = 1       
vastly imprv. = 7 
1 to 7            
no imprv. = 1      
vastly imprv. = 
7 
1 to 7            
not at all = 1      
significantly = 7 
1 to 7            
not at all = 1      
significantly = 7 




No. Program PIWS PIWJS PIWN PFWN PTM 
61 Innovative Space-Based Radar Antenna Technology (ISAT) 1 1 2 6 5 
62 Improving Warfighters Information Intake Under Stress (IWIIUS) 5 5 2 6 6 
63 Passive Cellular Core Jet Blaster Deflector (JBD) 1 4 1 5 5 
64 Jigsaw 5 2 2 6 6 
65 Learning Applied to Ground Robotics (LAGR) 2 5 2 6 5 
66 Language and Speech Exploitation Resources (LASER) POR 3 5 6 2 6 
67 Low-Cost Cruise Missile Defense (LCCMD) 4 2 5 2 5 
68 Long View 1 1 2 6 4 
69 Low Friction Engine Development Program 1 2 4 4 3 
70 Low Temperature Colossal Super-Saturation (LTCSS) 1 2 5 2 3 
71 Morphing Aircraft Structures (MAS) III 1 1 1 4 2 
72 Micro Air Vehicle Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (MAV ACTD) 7 6 6 2 6 
73 Multicell and Dismounted Command and Control (M&DC2) 3 2 1 4 6 
74 Meso-Scale Steam Engine Generator (MSEG) Program 1 4 2 6 4 
75 Model-Based Integration of Embedded Software (MoBIES) 1 2 4 4 6 
76 Project Mobius: A Study on the Feasibility of Learning by Reading 1 1 2 5 2 
77 Applications of Molecular Electronics (MoleApps) 3 2 1 6 3 
78 Mission Specific Processing (MSP) 2 3 2 5 4 
79 Network Embedded Systems Technology (NEST) 7 4 6 2 6 
80 National Tactical Exploitation Program (NTEX) 5 6 2 5 6 
81 Optical Code Division Multiple Access (O-CDMA) 6 6 2 6 4 
82 Optically Designated Attack Munitions (ODAM) 6 6 5 3 5 
83 Orbital Express (OE) Space Operations Architecture 2 6 1 6 7 
84 Oblique Flying Wing (OFW) 4 4 1 5 3 
85 Optical and Radio Frequency (RF) Combined Link Experiment (ORCLE) 2 6 2 5 6 
86 Program Composition for Embedded Systems (PCES) 1 6 3 5 7 
88 Radar Scope 6 6 6 2 7 
89 Reversible Barriers Program (ReBar) 6 6 6 2 5 
90 Synthetic Aperture LADAR for Tactical Imaging (SALTI) 2 5 2 6 6 
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Prepares DoD for 
the future 
Scale   
1 to 7            
not useful = 1     
very useful = 7 
1 to 7             
continuous = 1 
disruptive = 7 
1 to 7                
not rev. = 1           
exceptionally rev. = 
7 
1 to 7                  
no enhance. = 1          
complete enhance. = 7 
1 to 7               
not at all = 1         
exceptionally so = 
7 
ID 
No. Program PEU PCD PREV PLTP PDF 
61 Innovative Space-Based Radar Antenna Technology (ISAT) 4 6 5 4 6 
62 Improving Warfighters Information Intake Under Stress (IWIIUS) 5 6 6 1 6 
63 Passive Cellular Core Jet Blaster Deflector (JBD) 4 2 2 5 5 
64 Jigsaw 6 6 6 1 5 
65 Learning Applied to Ground Robotics (LAGR) 6 3 3 5 5 
66 Language and Speech Exploitation Resources (LASER) POR 7 6 6 1 6 
67 Low-Cost Cruise Missile Defense (LCCMD) 6 6 5 2 5 
68 Long View 3 5 5 1 5 
69 Low Friction Engine Development Program 6 3 4 6 6 
70 Low Temperature Colossal Super-Saturation (LTCSS) 6 3 5 6 3 
71 Morphing Aircraft Structures (MAS) III 5 4 6 1 5 
72 Micro Air Vehicle Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (MAV ACTD) 6 4 6 2 3 
73 Multicell and Dismounted Command and Control (M&DC2) 5 6 3 2 5 
74 Meso-Scale Steam Engine Generator (MSEG) Program 6 6 4 2 5 
75 Model-Based Integration of Embedded Software (MoBIES) 6 4 4 2 3 
76 Project Mobius: A Study on the Feasibility of Learning by Reading 6 6 5 1 5 
77 Applications of Molecular Electronics (MoleApps) 4 6 5 4 5 
78 Mission Specific Processing (MSP) 5 3 4 3 5 
79 Network Embedded Systems Technology (NEST) 6 5 5 2 5 
80 National Tactical Exploitation Program (NTEX) 6 3 4 2 5 
81 Optical Code Division Multiple Access (O-CDMA) 6 TBR TBR 6 6 
82 Optically Designated Attack Munitions (ODAM) 5 4 5 6 4 
83 Orbital Express (OE) Space Operations Architecture 7 3 6 6 6 
84 Oblique Flying Wing (OFW) 6 5 6 1 5 
85 Optical and Radio Frequency (RF) Combined Link Experiment (ORCLE) 5 2 4 5 5 
86 Program Composition for Embedded Systems (PCES) 6 5 5 6 6 
88 Radar Scope 7 5 6 1 5 
89 Reversible Barriers Program (ReBar) 6 3 5 1 2 




APPENDIX E.   DARPA TECHNOLOGY DATABASE (CONTINUED) 
   TECHNOLOGIES 61-90 (CONTINUED) 
Mission fit 
(right tech, 
place, & time) 
Flexibility in 
mission use 






Scale   
1 to 7           
no fit = 1        
great fit = 7 
1 to 7             
not flexible = 1     
very flexible = 7 
1 to 7                
not adaptable = 1      
very adaptable = 7 
1 to 7                   
not interoperable = 1       
very interoperable = 7 
1 to 7                 
no savings = 1          
significant savings = 7 
ID 
No. Program PMF PFMU PAUN PINT PSAV 
61 Innovative Space-Based Radar Antenna Technology (ISAT) 2 1 N/A N/A 1 
62 Improving Warfighters Information Intake Under Stress (IWIIUS) 3 4 6 4 2 
63 Passive Cellular Core Jet Blaster Deflector (JBD) 1 1 1 N/A 4 
64 Jigsaw 5 2 4 4 1 
65 Learning Applied to Ground Robotics (LAGR) 2 4 6 5 1 
66 Language and Speech Exploitation Resources (LASER) POR 5 3 6 1 3 
67 Low-Cost Cruise Missile Defense (LCCMD) 5 2 2 4 5 
68 Long View 2 1 1 N/A 1 
69 Low Friction Engine Development Program 5 2 5 5 3 
70 Low Temperature Colossal Super-Saturation (LTCSS) 5 1 1 N/A 5 
71 Morphing Aircraft Structures (MAS) III 1 5 3 N/A 1 
72 Micro Air Vehicle Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (MAV ACTD) 6 5 6 2 4 
73 Multicell and Dismounted Command and Control (M&DC2) 3 5 5 5 5 
74 Meso-Scale Steam Engine Generator (MSEG) Program 3 1 6 5 3 
75 Model-Based Integration of Embedded Software (MoBIES) 5 6 6 5 4 
76 Project Mobius: A Study on the Feasibility of Learning by Reading 2 5 5 N/A 5 
77 Applications of Molecular Electronics (MoleApps) 2 3 5 4 3 
78 Mission Specific Processing (MSP) 3 6 6 5 5 
79 Network Embedded Systems Technology (NEST) 6 5 4 5 4 
80 National Tactical Exploitation Program (NTEX) 4 6 4 5 4 
81 Optical Code Division Multiple Access (O-CDMA) 4 5 2 6 4 
82 Optically Designated Attack Munitions (ODAM) 2 2 3 4 5 
83 Orbital Express (OE) Space Operations Architecture 2 5 5 5 6 
84 Oblique Flying Wing (OFW) 2 5 2 2 5 
85 Optical and Radio Frequency (RF) Combined Link Experiment (ORCLE) 2 5 2 6 2 
86 Program Composition for Embedded Systems (PCES) 5 6 5 5 6 
88 Radar Scope 6 2 2 N/A 2 
89 Reversible Barriers Program (ReBar) 5 2 6 N/A 6 
90 Synthetic Aperture LADAR for Tactical Imaging (SALTI) 2 5 2 5 2 
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Scale   
Yes = 1       
No = 0   
Yes = 1      
No = 0 
Yes = 1     
No = 0 
Yes = 1      
No = 0 
Yes = 1       
No = 0 
Yes = 1        
No = 0 
ID 
No. Program TW TORG TPOR TST TOD TOTH TZ 
91 Shape Charge Armor 0   1 0 1 0 0 
92 Super High Efficiency Diode Sources (SHEDS) 0   0 0 0 1 0 
94 Stochastic and Perturbation Methods in PDE Systems (SPM) 0   0 0 0 0 1 
95 Sticky Flare 0   0 1 0 0 0 
96 Small Uninhabited Air Vehicle Engine (SUAVE) 0   0 0 0 0 1 
97 Polymorphous Computing Architectures (PCA) 0   0 0 1 1 0 
98 Quantum Information Science and Technology (QuIST) 0   0 0 0 0 1 
99 Real-Time Adversarial Intelligence and Decision-Making (RAID) 1 US Army 1 1 0 0 0 
100 Real World Reasoning (REAL) 0   0 0 0 0 1 
101 Robust Integrated Power Electronics (RIPE) 0   0 0 0 0 1 
102 Self Decontaminating Surfaces (SDS) Program 0   1 1 0 1 0 
103 Software-Enabled Control (SEC) 0   0 0 0 0 1 
104 Sensing and Patrolling Enablers Yielding Enhanced SASO (SPEYES) 1 US Army, USMC 0 0 0 0 0 
105 Spectral Sensing of Bio-Aerosols (SSBA) 0   0 0 0 0 1 
106 Superconducting Hybrid Power Electronics (SuperHyPE) 0   0 0 0 0 1 
107 Sub-Millimeter Wave Imaging Focal-Plane Technology (SWIFT) 0   0 0 1 0 0 
108 Technology for Efficient, Agile Microsystems (TEAM) 0 USAF 1 1 1 0 0 
109 Tactical Targeting Network Technology (TTNT) 0 USAF 1 1 0 0 0 
110 UltraLog 0 US Army 1 1 0 1 0 
111 UrbanScape 0 US Army 1 0 0 0 0 
112 Unique Signature Detection  0   0 0 0 0 1 
113 Virtual Autopsy Program 1   0 0 0 0 0 
114 Waveforms for Active Sensing (WAS) 0   0 0 0 0 1 
115 Ocean Wave Energy Harvesting Program 0   0 0 0 1 0 




APPENDIX E.   DARPA TECHNOLOGY DATABASE (CONTINUED) 





















Scale     
Yes = 1       
No = 0 
Yes = 1        
No = 0   
Yes = 1        
No = 0 
Yes = 1       
No = 0 
Lab = 1        
Field = 2      
Other = 3 
ID 
No. Program TS TC TM 
 
PWC  DUOM TBR TE 
91 Shape Charge Armor 9 1 0 2,357 0 0 1 
92 Super High Efficiency Diode Sources (SHEDS) UKN 1 0 1,403 0 0 1 
94 Stochastic and Perturbation Methods in PDE Systems (SPM) N/A 0 0 1,816 0 1 1 
95 Sticky Flare 6 1 0 920 0 0 1 
96 Small Uninhabited Air Vehicle Engine (SUAVE) N/A 0 0 1,121 0 0 1 
97 Polymorphous Computing Architectures (PCA) 84 1 0 2,732 0 0 1 
98 Quantum Information Science and Technology (QuIST) N/A 0 0 1,068 0 0 1 
99 Real-Time Adversarial Intelligence and Decision-Making (RAID) 41 1 0 1,094 0 0 1 
100 Real World Reasoning (REAL) N/A 0 0 1,422 0 0 1 
101 Robust Integrated Power Electronics (RIPE) N/A 0 0 604 0 0 1 
102 Self Decontaminating Surfaces (SDS) Program 36 1 1 3,735 0 0 1 
103 Software-Enabled Control (SEC) N/A 0 0 1,819 0 0 1 
104 Sensing and Patrolling Enablers Yielding Enhanced SASO (SPEYES) 19 1 0 1,711 0 0 3 
105 Spectral Sensing of Bio-Aerosols (SSBA) N/A 0 0 939 0 0 1 
106 Superconducting Hybrid Power Electronics (SuperHyPE) N/A 0 0 631 0 0 1 
107 Sub-Millimeter Wave Imaging Focal-Plane Technology (SWIFT) 34 1 0 4,833 0 1 1 
108 Technology for Efficient, Agile Microsystems (TEAM) UKN 1 0 2,422 0 1 1 
109 Tactical Targeting Network Technology (TTNT) N/A 1 0 1,910 0 0 3 
110 UltraLog 50 1 0 3,188 0 0 1 
111 UrbanScape 43 1 0 2,643 0 0 1 
112 Unique Signature Detection  N/A 0 0 1,340 0 0 1 
113 Virtual Autopsy Program 19 1 0 1,862 0 0 3 
114 Waveforms for Active Sensing (WAS) N/A 0 0 708 0 1 1 
115 Ocean Wave Energy Harvesting Program 65 1 0 2,201 0 0 3 
116 Video Verification of Identity Program (VIVID) 27 1 1 3,895 0 0 1 
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APPENDIX E.   DARPA TECHNOLOGY DATABASE (CONTINUED) 











warfighter need Tech. maturity 
Scale   
1 to 7              
no imprv. = 1       
vastly imprv. = 7 
1 to 7              
no imprv. = 1       
vastly imprv. = 7 
1 to 7           
not at all = 1      
significantly = 7 
1 to 7            
not at all = 1      
significantly = 7 
1 to 9            
Based on TRLs 
ID 
No. Program PIWS PIWJS PIWN PFWN PTM 
91 Shape Charge Armor 7 2 6 3 7 
92 Super High Efficiency Diode Sources (SHEDS) 2 4 1 4 6 
94 Stochastic and Perturbation Methods in PDE Systems (SPM) 1 1 1 2 N/A 
95 Sticky Flare 5 2 3 4 5 
96 Small Uninhabited Air Vehicle Engine (SUAVE) 1 2 2 6 5 
97 Polymorphous Computing Architectures (PCA) 1 6 2 6 7 
98 Quantum Information Science and Technology (QuIST) 4 4 2 6 4 
99 Real-Time Adversarial Intelligence and Decision-Making (RAID) 6 4 2 6 6 
100 Real World Reasoning (REAL) 2 6 1 5 6 
101 Robust Integrated Power Electronics (RIPE) 1 5 3 5 5 
102 Self Decontaminating Surfaces (SDS) Program 3 5 2 5 6 
103 Software-Enabled Control (SEC) 1 5 2 6 6 
104 Sensing and Patrolling Enablers Yielding Enhanced SASO (SPEYES) 7 5 6 2 7 
105 Spectral Sensing of Bio-Aerosols (SSBA) 6 3 2 4 5 
106 Superconducting Hybrid Power Electronics (SuperHyPE) 1 4 3 5 4 
107 Sub-Millimeter Wave Imaging Focal-Plane Technology (SWIFT) 1 4 2 5 5 
108 Technology for Efficient, Agile Microsystems (TEAM) 1 6 2 6 6 
109 Tactical Targeting Network Technology (TTNT) 3 6 2 5 6 
110 UltraLog 3 6 3 5 6 
111 UrbanScape 5 5 5 2 5 
112 Unique Signature Detection  1 3 1 4 3 
113 Virtual Autopsy Program 5 5 2 4 7 
114 Waveforms for Active Sensing (WAS) 5 4 3 4 4 
115 Ocean Wave Energy Harvesting Program 1 4 4 5 6 




APPENDIX E.   DARPA TECHNOLOGY DATABASE (CONTINUED) 











Prepares DoD for 
the future 
Scale   
1 to 7              
not useful = 1       
very useful = 7 
1 to 7           
continuous = 1 
disruptive = 7 
1 to 7                   
not rev. = 1              
exceptionally rev. = 7 
1 to 7                   
no enhance. = 1          
complete enhance. = 7 
1 to 7               
not at all = 1         
exceptionally so = 
7 
ID 
No. Program PEU PCD PREV PLTP PDF 
91 Shape Charge Armor 6 3 5 5 2 
92 Super High Efficiency Diode Sources (SHEDS) 3 3 5 1 6 
94 Stochastic and Perturbation Methods in PDE Systems (SPM) N/A TBR TBR TBR TBR 
95 Sticky Flare 6 4 5 1 2 
96 Small Uninhabited Air Vehicle Engine (SUAVE) 5 3 4 6 5 
97 Polymorphous Computing Architectures (PCA) 6 4 5 6 5 
98 Quantum Information Science and Technology (QuIST) 5 6 5 5 5 
99 Real-Time Adversarial Intelligence and Decision-Making (RAID) 8 6 6 2 6 
100 Real World Reasoning (REAL) 6 5 5 3 5 
101 Robust Integrated Power Electronics (RIPE) 6 3 3 5 5 
102 Self Decontaminating Surfaces (SDS) Program 6 6 6 N/A 5 
103 Software-Enabled Control (SEC) 4 2 2 6 4 
104 Sensing and Patrolling Enablers Yielding Enhanced SASO (SPEYES) 7 5 7 2 2 
105 Spectral Sensing of Bio-Aerosols (SSBA) 5 3 4 1 4 
106 Superconducting Hybrid Power Electronics (SuperHyPE) 6 6 6 5 5 
107 Sub-Millimeter Wave Imaging Focal-Plane Technology (SWIFT) 3 6 5 5 5 
108 Technology for Efficient, Agile Microsystems (TEAM) 5 6 5 5 5 
109 Tactical Targeting Network Technology (TTNT) 6 3 5 4 2 
110 UltraLog 6 5 5 5 5 
111 UrbanScape 5 6 6 1 3 
112 Unique Signature Detection  5 7 7 1 3 
113 Virtual Autopsy Program 6 5 3 1 4 
114 Waveforms for Active Sensing (WAS) 5 TBR TBR TBR TBR 
115 Ocean Wave Energy Harvesting Program 6 6 5 2 5 
116 Video Verification of Identity Program (VIVID) 6 3 5 6 3 
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Scale   
1 to 7         
no fit = 1      
great fit = 
7 
1 to 7             
not flexible = 1     
very flexible = 7 
1 to 7               
not adaptable = 1     
very adaptable = 7 
1 to 7                  
not interoperable = 1    
very interoperable = 
7 
1 to 7                 
no savings = 1          
significant savings = 7 
ID 
No. Program PMF PFMU PAUN PINT PSAV 
91 Shape Charge Armor 6 1 1 2 3 
92 Super High Efficiency Diode Sources (SHEDS) 2 6 6 N/A 5 
94 Stochastic and Perturbation Methods in PDE Systems (SPM) TBR TBR TBR TBR TBR 
95 Sticky Flare 2 2 2 5 3 
96 Small Uninhabited Air Vehicle Engine (SUAVE) 2 2 4 4 4 
97 Polymorphous Computing Architectures (PCA) 3 6 6 5 4 
98 Quantum Information Science and Technology (QuIST) 2 4 6 5 5 
99 Real-Time Adversarial Intelligence and Decision-Making (RAID) 3 5 6 N/A 5 
100 Real World Reasoning (REAL) 3 5 5 5 4 
101 Robust Integrated Power Electronics (RIPE) 2 3 6 5 5 
102 Self Decontaminating Surfaces (SDS) Program 2 4 6 N/A 6 
103 Software-Enabled Control (SEC) 2 2 6 5 4 
104 Sensing and Patrolling Enablers Yielding Enhanced SASO (SPEYES) 6 6 6 N/A 4 
105 Spectral Sensing of Bio-Aerosols (SSBA) 2 2 2 N/A 2 
106 Superconducting Hybrid Power Electronics (SuperHyPE) 3 2 5 5 5 
107 Sub-Millimeter Wave Imaging Focal-Plane Technology (SWIFT) 2 5 5 5 4 
108 Technology for Efficient, Agile Microsystems (TEAM) 2 2 5 5 3 
109 Tactical Targeting Network Technology (TTNT) 4 5 6 5 2 
110 UltraLog 4 2 6 5 5 
111 UrbanScape 5 2 5 4 6 
112 Unique Signature Detection  1 1 1 N/A 4 
113 Virtual Autopsy Program 3 1 3 4 5 
114 Waveforms for Active Sensing (WAS) TBR TBR TBR TBR TBR 
115 Ocean Wave Energy Harvesting Program 4 1 7 5 7 
116 Video Verification of Identity Program (VIVID) 6 4 5 6 2 
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